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Abstract
We study the impact of two basic principles of fairness on the
structure of competition systems and perform our analysis by focus-
ing on sports competitions. The first principle states that equally
strong players should have the same chances of being the final win-
ner, while the second principle requires that the competition system
should not favor weaker players. We apply these requirements to a
class of competitions which includes, but is not limited to, the sport
tournament systems that are most commonly used in practice, such
as round-robin tournaments and different kinds of knockout competi-
tions, and we characterize the structures satisfying these requirements.
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In our results, a new competition structure that we call an antler is
found to play a referential role. Finally, we show that the class of fair
competition systems becomes rather small when both fairness princi-
ples are jointly applied.
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1 Introduction
Numerous decision problems require the selection of an alternative from a set
of options on the basis of the information obtained from pairwise comparisons
among the available alternatives. Examples of these problems can be found
in voting theory (cf. Brams and Fishburn 2002, Laslier 1997, Levin and
Nalebuff 1995, Moulin 1986), multi-criteria decision making (Larichev 2001,
Olson 1996), and promotion mechanisms implemented in firms (Rosen 1986).
However, the most popular problem of this type is probably that of selecting
a winner in a sport competition, where the alternatives are the competing
“players” and the pairwise comparisons take the form of “matches”.
In this work, we present an axiomatic approach to the fairness aspect
of these kinds of selection problems. Although our analysis is potentially
applicable in different situations, in this work we frame the study in the
context of sport competitions. Our interest in this field goes beyond its
use as a mere theoretical parable given the enormous economic and social
relevance that the sport industry has nowadays.
Every sport competition needs a well-defined and pre-established set of
basic rules that determines the “competition system”: who plays against
whom, at which stage of the competition, and how the final winner is de-
cided. A competition organizer can plausibly consider different objectives
when designing the competition system, such as the intensity of the matches,
suspense, attracting the interest of the spectators, optimizing organizational
costs, and so on. However, fairness is always a top priority within the goals
of any competition designer.
Discussions about whether one or another system is more or less fair than
another are often made at an intuitive and informal level. In our work, we
provide a structured analysis of such discussions and we present a rigorous
concept of “fair competition design”. In doing so, we formally define two
neat principles of fairness that respond to what is commonly pursued in real
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practice and translate to our context the Aristotelian Justice Principle of
“treating equals equally and unequals unequally”. In our framework, these
principles require that the competition system should not favor weaker play-
ers, on the one hand, and that equally strong players should have the same
chances of being the final winner, on the other hand. We then study to what
extent different competition systems perform in relation to these principles,
trying to give formal support to such informal debates. The systems that we
consider can be roughly partitioned into two major classes: elimination-type
competitions and league-type competitions.
In elimination-type competitions, which are also called “knockout tourna-
ments”, or “playoff tournaments”, the competition is organized in rounds or
“stages”. Losers are eliminated and players progress as they win their corre-
sponding matches in the round, being paired off in the next round, so that
the final winner is the player who wins all the rounds. These competitions
can be represented by binary trees, as exemplified in Figure 1.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Figure 1: A balanced elimination-
type competition
Elimination-type competitions, such as
the one displayed in Figure 1, are called bal-
anced because every payer is required to win
the same number of matches to become the
final winner. In some cases, such as in the
American National Football League, play-
ers have the right of “byes”; meaning that,
on the basis of a previous qualification rat-
ing, they have the privilege to skip the initial
round (or rounds) without the need of play-
ing. In fact, “byes” becomes necessary if
the number of players is not a power of 2. A
special type of elimination competition with
byes has a so-called “stepladder” structure
(see Figure 2). This system and its variants
are used in ten-pin bowling and squash, for example.
The design of an elimination-type competition requires a solution to the
problem of “seeding”; that is, of assigning players’ names to the “leaves”
of the competition’s tree. This involves deciding the pairing in the initial
matches and, if that is the case, which player(s) deserve(s) the byes. Clearly,
the seeding will have a crucial impact on the chances for a player to become
the final winner.
In a league-type competition every player participates in a given number
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of matches against other players. A certain number of points is assigned to
the winner of each match, and the final winner is the player with the highest
score of points. The most widely used league-type competitions are “single
round-robin tournaments”, where each player plays against every other player
once, and “double round-robin tournaments”, where each player plays twice
against every other player.
5 4
3
2
1
Figure 2: A
stepladder com-
petition
Each type of competition system has its pros and cons,
related for instance with the number of matches needed to
have a final winner, organizational costs, profitability for
the organizer, the possibility for inconsequential matches
to be played, or the manipulability by the players. While
admitting the importance of all of these issues, in this work
we exclusively concentrate on the analysis of competition
systems from the point of view of the fairness that is intrin-
sically associated to their structure.
Literature overview
The literature about fairness in competition systems is
rather disseminated. Related works usually study particu-
lar competition systems and fairness aspects related with
their specificities. Most of the attention in this respect
has been paid to how alternative seeding procedures in an
elimination-type competition perform according to differ-
ent properties, the latter being generally related with the idea of favouring
the stronger players. For example, Horen and Riezman (1985) analyse bal-
anced elimination-type competitions with four players, Hwang (1982) con-
sider the eight-players case, Prince et al. (2013) analyse the eight-players
and 16-players cases, and Schwenk (2000) looks at the general case under a
special form of random seeding. Ely et al. (2015) study the performance of a
stepladder competition with three players focusing on maximizing suspense
and surprise.
In the case of round-robin tournaments, Briskorn and Knust (2010) study
properties with a fairness flavour in relation to the schedule of the rounds.
Moon and Pullman (1970) concentrate on “equalizing” handicapping meth-
ods. Rubinstein (1980) shows axiomatically that the point system used in
round-robin competitions is the only one that satisfies three axioms inspired
from social choice theory. Levin and Nalebuff (1995) make an analogy be-
tween round-robin punctuation systems and voting systems. Finally, fairness
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in sports has also been analyzed with respect to tie-breaking mechanisms (cf.
Apestegu´ıa and Palacios-Huerta 2010 and Che and Hendershott 2008).
There is a line of research that introduces exertion of effort as a strate-
gic variable (cf. Rosen 1986, Groh et al. 2012, Krumer et al. 2017, and
Pauly 2014) and which studies the possibility for manipulation by players.
The analysis has always been made for a small number of players (usually
four) because it is generally accepted that the extension to a larger number
of players involves an excessive complexity due to the highly complicated
combinatorial structure of the problem.
As to the comparison among different competition systems, most studies
apply statistical simulation techniques to check the fulfilment of particular
properties, or how the competition systems perform according to particular
metrics (cf. Appleton 1995, McGarry and Schutz 1997, Scarf et al. 2009,
Ryvkin and Ortmann 2008, and Ryvkin 2010). There is also a considerable
body of literature in operations research related with sports. These works
include many aspects, aside from fairness, that are out of the scope of this
work. The interested reader is referred to Wright (2014) and Kendall et al.
(2010) for surveys in the field.
Our contribution
We formalize these two basic ideas of fairness by means of two simple axioms
that have a “rank-preserving” flavour: an “equal treatment” requirement
which states that “equally strong players should have the same probability of
being the final winner”, and a “monotonicity in strength” condition requiring
that “a weaker player should not have a higher probability of being the final
winner than a stronger player”.
Each of these axioms is presented in a strong form and in a weak form.
The corresponding strong versions impose that a competition system should
fulfill the property for every possible assignment (or seeding) of the players in
the system, while the corresponding weak forms only requires the fulfilment
of the property for at least one assignment of the players.
Our results include characterizations of the competition systems satisfy-
ing these fairness properties. In the case of the weak versions of the axioms,
we also specify the class of seeding rules that let the structures satisfy the
axioms. Generally speaking, equal treatment leads to balanced competitions
in which every player participates in the same number of matches (Theorem
1, Theorem 4, and Theorem 5), while monotonicity in strength drastically
restricts the number of players in the competition to two (Theorem 2 and
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Theorem 6). When weak monotonicity in strength is under consideration, the
class of competition systems fulfilling it increases. For instance, elimination-
type competitions turn out to only be weakly monotonic in strength if the tree
structure representing the competition does not contain a special substruc-
ture, which we call an “antler” (Theorem 3). This structure combines the
characteristics of balanced elimination competitions with the “byes” spirit of
stepladders. Moreover, we show that the seeding rule for which an antler-free
competition satisfies weak monotonicity in strength is unique.
The rest of the work is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the basic
elements of the formal model. Section 3 introduces the four fairness axioms.
Sections 4 and 5 are devoted to the characterization results with respect
to elimination-type and league-type competitions, respectively. Section 6
concludes and addresses possible extensions of the model. All of the omitted
proofs are collected in Appendix A (for elimination tournaments) and in
Appendix B (for leagues).
2 The model
The main ingredients of our model are the graph representation of a compe-
tition system, the description of players’ strength in terms of winning prob-
ability matrices, the notion of a seeding rule and the probability for each
player to be the final winner as a consequence of all the previous elements.
Graph representation of competition systems
We assume that matches always take place between two players in such a
way that ties are not possible and we represent a competition system by
means of a graph. In the case of elimination-type competitions, each match
is represented by an elementary binary tree; that is, a graph with three nodes
{a, b, w} and two links {aw, bw} with, let us say, player i being assigned to
node a, player j being assigned to node b, and the winner of the match be-
tween i and j being assigned to node w. In this case, we say that i is matched
with j.
Elimination-type competitions can then be represented by a graph con-
necting in a specific way such elementary binary trees, forming a binary tree
with a finite number of nodes, such as those in Figures 1 and 2.
To perform an adequate comparative study, we represent league-type
competitions consistently with the previously described representation of
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elimination-type competitions. In particular, league-type competitions will
be represented by a collection (or forest) of disconnected elementary binary
trees, each of them representing a match of the league (see Figure 3).1
1 2 1 3 1 4 2 3 2 4 3 4
Figure 3: A league-type competition
Given a graph G of any of the two types described above, we denote by
t ∈ G a particular binary tree of the graph, and by #G the number of trees
that G contains. The set of nodes (or vertices) of a binary tree t ∈ G is
denoted by V (t). The set of leaves (or terminal nodes) of t ∈ G is denoted
by Λ(t), Λ(t) ⊂ V (t). The notation for the set of leaves of G is Λ(G).
The distance between two nodes of t ∈ G is defined by the minimal
number of edges that are necessary to connect them. The level `(v) of a node
v ∈ V (t) is the distance between it and the root of the binary tree t. The k-th
level of a tree t is the set of all nodes of the tree of level k.2 The height h(t)
of a binary tree t is the maximal level of its leaves, h(t) = maxλ∈Λ(t){`(λ)}.
By Λk(t) we denote the set of leaves of t whose level is k. We say that a
binary tree t ∈ G is balanced (or that it represents a balanced competition) if
the level of all of its leaves is the same. Notice that a stepladder competition
is represented by a binary tree t with two leaves at level h(t) and a unique
leaf at each level ` for all ` < h(t).
Players’ strength and winning probabilities
Let N be the finite set of competing players. We assume that the elements
of N are completely ordered according to a binary relation R of strength so
that, for all i, j ∈ N , iRj is interpreted as “player i is at least as strong as
player j”. The corresponding asymmetric and symmetric factors of R are
denoted, respectively, by P and I, so that iP j reads “ i is strictly stronger
than j” and iIj reads “ i and j are equally strong”.
1The figure represents a single round-robin competition among four players. As we will
see later, our definition of a league-type competition allows, and the corresponding results
account for the possibility for players to participate in different numbers of matches.
2The different levels of a tree are usually interpreted as rounds of the competition.
However, these are usually numbered in inverse terms; that is, the last level of the tree
constitutes the first round of the competition, the second last level constitutes the second
round and so on.
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We attach a probabilistic meaning to the binary relation of strength in
the sense that iRj presupposes that “the probability with which player i
defeats in a match player j is greater than or equal to 0.5”. We denote this
fact by pij ≥ 0.5. Given that R is complete, we have that iP j is accordingly
interpreted as pij > 0.5 and iIj is interpreted as pij = 0.5. Throughout the
next sections, we take the non-deterministic view that 0 < pij < 1 holds for
all i, j ∈ N . This assumption is taken simply to show that the presence of
deterministic values is not what makes the different theorems and lemmas
hold in a trivial way. It is easy check that all results also hold for the case
of pij ∈ [0, 1] for all i, j ∈ N . We adopt the convention that the players in
N are ordered according to R; that is, if iP j then i < j (if iIj then either
i < j or j < i).
According to this interpretation, every binary relation of strength R in-
duces a set of winning probability matrices, PR, defined on N×N that support
(or are compatible with) R. More precisely, PR is the set of all probability
matrices such that, for p ∈ PR, we have that pij ≥ 0.5 if and only if iRj.
The fairness properties that we consider are required to be fulfilled for each
probability matrix p ∈ PR given a binary relation R, so that the particular
details of p are not needed for the results.
Following the related models (cf. David 1963, Hwang 1982, Horen and
Riezmann 1985, and Schwenck 2000), we also assume that, given R, every
probability matrix p ∈ PR satisfies the following two conditions:
∀i, j ∈ N, pij + pji = 1. (1)
∀i, j ∈ N, pij ≥ 0.5 implies pik ≥ pjk for each k ∈ N \ {i, j} . (2)
The interpretation of (1) is straightforward. Condition (2) simply ex-
presses the fact that any player defeats with higher probability a weaker
player than a stronger player. It also implies that if two players are equally
strong (pij = 0.5), then they should defeat with equal probability any third
player.
Conditions (1) and (2) are equivalent to what is sometimes referred as
“strong stochastic transitivity” of the representing probability matrix (cf.
David 1963). If players are displayed in the matrix according to their strength,
then strongly stochastically transitive matrices are nondecreasing in rows,
nonincreasing in columns and, whenever pij = 0.5, the corresponding rows
and columns of i and j are equal.
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As the reader can easily see, if a probability matrix p ∈ PR satisfies the
above two conditions (as we assume), then the binary relation R is transitive.
Moreover, for a, b, c, d ∈ N we have that
aRbRcRd implies pad ≥ pbc. (3)
This fact is frequently used in the proofs to follow.
Seeding and the probability of being the final winner
Given a finite set N of competing players and a graph G of the type discussed
above, a seeding rule is a function s : Λ(G)→ N that assigns players of N to
the leaves of G. When s(λ) = i holds for λ ∈ Λ(G) and i ∈ N , we say that
“player i is assigned, or “seeded”, to leaf λ”. We assume that any such rule
satisfies the following two properties: (1) s is a surjective function—that is,
every player is seeded to at least one leaf in G; and, (2) the restriction of s
to any binary tree t ∈ G is injective—that is, no player from N is seeded to
more than one leaf of t but there could be players that are not seeded to a
leaf of t when #G > 1.
When a seeding rule s satisfies these conditions, we will say that s is a
feasible seeding for G. As a consequence of the two assumptions above, we
have that if s is feasible for G = {t}, then each player in N is seeded to
exactly one leaf of G and |Λ(G)| = |N |. Moreover, we have 2 ≤ |N | ≤ |Λ(G)|
whenever #G > 1 holds.3
At this point, we can define a competition system as a pair (G,N) con-
sisting of the graph that represents the structure of the matches of the com-
petition and the set N of players to be seeded to the leaves of the graph. We
say that (G,N) is admissible if it is possible to define a feasible seeding rule
for it. The set of all feasible seeding rules for a competition system (G,N)
will be denoted by S(G,N).
A seeding rule s ∈ S(G,N) determines the set of potential matches that can
be played at each round. Moreover, if a probability matrix p is given, then
the set of potential matches at each round is endowed with a probability
distribution. Then, given (G,N) and s, s′ ∈ S(G,N), we say that s and s′
are equivalent with respect to p if the probability distribution associated
with the set of potential matches at each round for s and for s′ is the same.
For instance, Figure 4 represents, for a balanced binary tree of height 2, a
3“Seeding” is a term typically used in elimination-type competitions but not in leagues.
For consistency reasons, we set our definition of a seeding rule to apply for both cases.
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situation where the two left seedings are equivalent but none of these two
seedings is equivalent to the right one.
1 2 3 4
(a)
4 3 1 2
(b)
1 3 2 4
(c)
Figure 4: The seedings in (a) and (b) are equivalent, while those in (a) and (c), and in (b)
and (c) are not
Given a competition system (G,N), we denote by wt the player who
reaches the root of the binary tree t ∈ G and say that i ∈ N is the winner
of the competition (G,N) if |{t ∈ G : wt = i}| ≥ |{t ∈ G : wt = j}| holds for
all j ∈ N . Obviously, if G = {t}, then the player who reaches the root of t
is the winner of the competition.
Given a competition system (G,N), a seeding rule s ∈ S(G,N)and a prob-
ability matrix p, we denote by ϕi(G, s,p) the probability with which player
i ∈ N will be the final winner of the competition. The probability with which
i ∈ N reaches the root of a particular tree t ∈ G is analogously denoted by
ϕi(t, s,p). Obviously, G = {t} implies ϕi(G, s,p) = ϕi(t, s,p) for each i ∈ N .
Finally, if s and s′ are equivalent seeding rules, then ϕi(G, s,p) = ϕi(G, s′,p)
holds for each i ∈ N .
3 Fairness axioms
We introduce now in a formal way the two previously mentioned fairness
principles. Each of these ideas is presented in a strong form and in a weak
form. To state them, we assume that a binary relation R of strength is de-
fined on the player set N .
Equal Treatment (ET) A competition system (G,N) satisfies ET if for
all s ∈ S(G,N), iIj for all i, j ∈ N implies ϕi(G, s,p) = ϕj(G, s,p) for all
i, j ∈ N .
Weak Equal Treatment (WET) A competition system (G,N) satisfies
WET if there exists s ∈ S(G,N) such that iIj for all i, j ∈ N implies
ϕi(G, s,p) = ϕj(G, s,p) for all i, j ∈ N .
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Monotonicity in Strength (MS) A competition system (G,N) satisfies
MS if for all s ∈ S(G,N), for all i, j ∈ N , and for all p ∈ PR such that
pij > 0.5, ϕi(G, s,p) ≥ ϕj(G, s,p) holds.
Weak Monotonicity in Strength (WMS) A competition system (G,N)
satisfies WMS if there exists s ∈ S(G,N) such that, for all i, j ∈ N and for all
p ∈ PR such that pij > 0.5, ϕi(G, s,p) ≥ ϕj(G, s,p) holds.
ET and WET express the idea that, as for the final probability of winning,
the competition system should not be biased towards any particular player
if all of them are equally skilled.
MS and WMS require the competition system not to benefit weaker
players under any of the possible probability matrices compatible with the
strength of the players. In fact, many competitions are precisely designed to
avoid that worse teams win by luck: for example, round-robin tournaments
and even double round-robin tournaments minimize such an effect with a
high number of matches, stepladder competitions seem to be precisely aimed
to benefit better players, best players are matched with the worst ones in
knockout competitions, or sometimes matches (usually finals) consist of a
higher number of legs at the better competitor’s home, such as in basket.
Apart of the fact that WET is logically weaker than ET and WMS is
logically weaker than MS, the normative power of the weaker versions versus
the strong versions may depend on the concrete intended application, and
in particular on the conjectures about the benevolence of the competition
designer. On the one hand, ET and MS avoid the possibility of manipu-
lation by a potentially corrupted competition designer because they ensure
that there is no possibility of finding any particular seeding rule that bene-
fits a particular player in relation with another one who is more or equally
skilled. On the other hand, WET and WMS rely on the confidence in the
benevolence of the competition designer, in the sense that the focus is on
competition systems where he or she can always find a seeding rule that is
fair, independently of the values in the probability matrices supporting the
strength relation.
4 Elimination-type competitions
This section is divided in two subsections. Subsection 4.1 includes our results
concerning the two equal treatment axioms (ET and WET) and the MS
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axiom. Subsection 4.2 contains several definitions and preliminary results
that end with a characterization of the class of elimination-type competitions
that satisfy the WMS axiom. Given that an elimination-type competition is
represented by a unique tree, we will denote it throughout the section by the
pair (t, N), where N is the fixed player set and t is the single binary tree.
4.1 Equal treatment and monotonicity in strength
The first result in this subsection connects the stronger version the equal
treatment axiom with the class of balanced competition systems.
Theorem 1 An elimination-type competition system (t, N) satisfies ET if
and only if t is balanced.
Proof. Let (t, N) be an elimination-type competition system with t being
balanced and let s ∈ S(t,N) be an arbitrary but fixed seeding rule. Given the
balancedness of t, any of its leaves has the same level coinciding with h(t).
Then, by pij = 0.5 for all i, j ∈ N , ϕi(t, s,p) = (0.5)h(t) holds for each i ∈ N .
Thus, (t, N) satisfies ET.
Suppose now that (t, N) is an elimination-type competition system satis-
fying ET. Let s ∈ S(G,N) be an arbitrary but fixed seeding rule. Suppose that
iIj for all i, j ∈ N but t is not balanced. We then have that pij = 0.5 holds
for all i, j ∈ N . Given that t is not balanced there are leaves λ, λ′ ∈ Λ(t)
with `(λ) 6= `(λ′). It follows then that ϕs(λ)(t, s,p) = (0.5)`(λ) 6= (0.5)`(λ′) =
ϕs(λ′)(t, s,p) in contradiction to (t, N) satisfying ET.
Notice that the argument used in the proof above is independent of the
characteristics of the seeding rule. Hence, we can immediately conclude that
no additional competition systems emerge when ET is replaced by its weak
version WET.
Corollary 1 An elimination-type competition system (t, N) satisfies WET
if and only if t is balanced.
We call a (balanced) competition system minimal if there are only two
participants in it. As it turns out, only minimal competitions satisfy MS.
Theorem 2 An elimination-type competition system (t, N) satisfies MS if
and only if it is minimal.
A minimal elimination-type competition clearly consists of a unique match.
Thus, Theorem 2 can be seen as having a clear flavour of an impossibility
result.
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4.2 Antler-free competitions and weak monotonicity
in strength
When WMS is imposed instead of the strong version, we obtain a character-
ization of a considerably richer class of elimination-type competitions. For
this characterization, a special type of binary tree (antlers) needs to be in-
troduced. We say that a binary tree t with h(t) = 3 is (1) an antler, if
|Λ(t)| = 6 with |Λ3(t)| = 4 and |Λ2(t)| = 2; (2) an asymmetric antler, if t is
an antler with the leaves in Λ2(t) having a common immediate predecessor;
and (3) a symmetric antler, if t is an antler with the leaves in Λ2(t) having
distinct immediate predecessors. Figure 5(a) displays an asymmetric antler
and Figure 5(b) represents a symmetric antler.
(a) (b)
Figure 5: The binary tree in (a) is an asymmetric antler, while the one in (b) is a symmetric
antler
These competition structures combine the characteristics of balanced
elimination trees with the “byes” spirit of stepladders. It is not easy to
find such competitions in practice but extended forms can be found in some
basketball tournaments and in the Basque pelota.
Antlers are of a definite theoretical interest. As later proved in Theo-
rem 3, they constitute the minimal competition systems violating WMS in
the sense that removing any match from an antler results in a system that
satisfies WMS and any tree that contains (as a subgraph) an antler lets the
competition system violate WMS. This naturally leads to the definition of
an antler-free tree as a binary tree that does not contain any (symmetric or
asymmetric) antler. Theorem 3 not only characterizes the set of elimination-
type competition systems that satisfy WMS as those displayed by an antler-
free binary tree but also uniquely specifies the seeding rule, which we call
“increasingly balanced” as the one for which WMS is satisfied.
With respect to their graph structure, antler-free trees can be charac-
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terized as binary trees having particular features. Lemma 1 in this section
provides such a characterization with the aim of facilitating the definition
of the increasingly balanced rule as well as the statement and the proof of
Theorem 3. Let us consider first the following definitions.
A root-to-leaf path connects the root of t with a leaf of t. By γ(t) we
denote a root-to-leaf path of length h(t) (i.e., γ(t) is a maximal root-to-leaf
path in t) and by Vγ(t) we denote the set of nodes of γ(t). For v ∈ Vγ(t),
tv denotes the subtree of t with root v and Λ−γ(tv) the set of leaves of tv
for which there is a shortest path to v not including any other node from
Vγ(t). Finally, we denote by h−γ(tv) the maximal geodesic distance between
v and the leaves in Λ−γ(tv). We call a binary tree t an extended stepladder
of degree x, x ∈ {1, . . . , h(t)}, if maxv∈Vγ(t) h−γ(tv) = x. That is, x is the
maximal distance between a node of γ(t) and a leaf that is not in γ(t).4
Any binary tree is in fact an extended stepladder of some degree. For ex-
ample, balanced elimination-type competitions with four players and asym-
metric antlers are extended stepladders of degree 2, balanced elimination-
type competitions with eight players and symmetric antlers are extended
stepladders of degree 3, while standard stepladders and elementary binary
trees are extended stepladders of degree 1.
We denote by ESx the set of extended stepladders of degree at most x
(note that ESx ⊆ ESx′ for x′ ≥ x). Furthermore, we use ES∗2 to denote the
subclass of ES2 defined as follows. An extended stepladder t of degree at
most 2 belongs to ES∗2 only if there exists a maximal root-to-leaf path γ(t)
such that for all v, v′ ∈ Vγ(t) with |`(v)− `(v′)| = 1, we have that h−γ(tv) = 2
implies h−γ(tv′) = 1. Clearly, ES1 ⊆ ES∗2 but not every extended stepladder
of degree 2 belongs to ES∗2 . Figure 6 exemplifies two extended stepladders
of degree 2 with only one of them belonging to ES∗2 . Notice further that
asymmetric antlers do belong to ES2 but not to ES
∗
2 , while symmetric antlers
do even not belong to ES2 because they are extended stepladders of degree
3.
The next lemma characterizes antler-free binary trees.
Lemma 1 A binary tree belongs to ES∗2 if and only if it is antler-free.
Let us now introduce the increasingly balanced seeding rule. This rule
takes into account the following two characteristics of antler-free binary trees:
4Clearly, by t being a binary tree, there are at least two maximal root-to-leaf paths in
t. Despite this fact, it can be easily shown that the degree of an extended stepladder is
robust with respect to the selection of any of the maximal root-to-leaf paths.
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(a) (b)
Figure 6: Extended stepladders of degree 2. Only the one displayed in (a) belongs to ES∗2
(1) they allow for four players to be involved in a balanced elimination-type
competition, and (2) they also incorporate byes at different levels.
We formally define the increasingly balanced rule for binary trees in ES2
and, therefore, by ES∗2 ⊂ ES2 and Lemma 1, for antler-free trees as well.
Since the rule makes use of the notion of a balanced seeding for balanced
elimination-type competitions with four players, we first introduce this type
of seeding. Given an admissible elimination-type competition system (t, N)
with |N | = 4 and a binary relation of strength R, we say that a seeding
rule s : Λ(t) → N is balanced (and we denote it by sb4) if there are players
i, j ∈ N who are initially playing against each other under s such that iRk
and kRj holds for each k ∈ N \ {i, j}. Thus, a seeding that matches 1 with
4 and 2 with 3 is always balanced. But a seeding that matches 1 with 3 and
2 with 4 would also be balanced if (and only if) 1I2 or 3I4. Similarly, a
seeding that matches 1 with 2 and 3 with 4 would also be balanced if (and
only if) 2I3I4.
We are now prepared to define the increasingly balanced seeding rule.
Let (t, N) be an elimination-type competition system with t ∈ ES2. Given a
binary relation of strength R, we say that a seeding rule s : Λ(t)→ N is in-
creasingly balanced (and we denote it by sib) if the following three conditions
hold:
(1) For all λ, λ′ ∈ Λ(t), λ ∈ Λ`(t) and λ′ ∈ Λ`′(t) with ` > `′ implies
s(λ′)Rs(λ);
(2) For all ` ∈ {1, . . . , h(t)− 1}, Λ`(t) = {λ, λ′, λ′′} with λ′ and λ′′ hav-
ing a common intermediate predecessor implies s(λ)Rs(λ′′′) for each λ′′′ ∈
{λ′, λ′′};
(3)
∣∣Λh(t)(t)∣∣ = 4 implies that: (a) iRj holds for each i ∈ N with
`(s−1(i)) < h(t) and j ∈ N with `(s−1(j)) = h(t), and (b) s(λ) = sb4(λ)
for each λ ∈ Λh(t)(t).
15
In other words, sib assigns players to leaves in such a way that weaker
players are seeded to higher levels in the tree. When more than one player is
seeded at the same level, then the rule distinguishes between two possibilities:
(a) if the level is not the maximal one, then the best player among those
seeded at that level is seeded to the leaf that is closest to the root-to-leaf
path γ(t); and (b) if the level is the maximal one and there are four leaves
at it, then among the weakest four players, the weakest one is matched with
the fourth weakest and the other two are matched together (see Figure 7).
8 5 6 7
4
1 2 3
Figure 7: An increasingly balanced
seeding in an extended stepladder of
degree 2
Note also that there are two cases in
which sib is silent. The first case is when
there are three leaves of t at the same
level and, therefore, the two weakest players
among the three seeded at that level play
their initial match. Clearly, in such a case,
the two possible seedings of these players are
equivalent. The second case is when there
are only two leaves of t at level h(t). In this
case, the two seedings of the two weakest
players are equivalent.
It should also be noted that, due to the
structure of the extended stepladder compe-
tition of degree 2, if there are three or four
leaves at a certain level, then four players
are playing a balanced elimination-type sub-
competition. The key feature of sib is that it ensures that the strongest of
the newly seeded players at that level will play against the survivor of the
previous elimination process who, by the construction of sib, is necessarily
weaker than any of the newly seeded players. In other words, sib ensures that
in any balanced elimination-type sub-competition played by four players, the
strongest player is matched with the weakest player.
Theorem 3 An elimination-type competition system (t, N) satisfies WMS
with respect to s ∈ S(t,N) if and only if t is antler-free and s = sib.
In many real situations there are 2q players participating in balanced
elimination-type competitions. Then, extended forms of the balanced seeding
are profusely taken because they are broadly considered to be a fair solution.5
A remarkable corollary of Theorem 3 is that no balanced competition satisfies
5In the case of eight players the “balanced” seeding would consist of matching 1 with
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WMS if q ≥ 3, that is, if eight or more players compete, then even if the
balanced seeding is used it is possible that weaker players have a strictly
higher probability of being the final winners. The reason for this is that the
binary trees that represent those competition systems do contain an antler.
Broadly speaking, it is impossible to find a fair balanced playoff competition
with more than four participants.
5 League-type competitions
As already advanced in the introduction, a league-type competition consists
of a pair (G,N), where N is the player set and G is a forest of elementary
binary trees. Recall that, as a consequence of the two assumptions on seeding
rules, s ∈ S(G,N) implies 2 ≤ |N | ≤ |Λ(G)|.
5.1 Equal participation and equal treatment
Similar to the case of elimination-type competitions, the fulfilment of the
two equal treatment axioms (ET and WET) by league-type competitions is
closely related with the fact that players should play the same number of
matches. The first result in this section shows that a league satisfies ET if
and only if either each player plays a unique match or there are only two
players participating in all matches.
Theorem 4 A league-type competition system (G,N) satisfies ET if and
only if either |Λ(G)| = |N | or |Λ(G)| > |N | = 2.
It is sometimes suggested that leagues are fair competition systems. How-
ever, this is not true in our framework because our definition of leagues is
much broader than what is popularly understood as “leagues”, which is usu-
ally identified with round-robin tournaments. In fact, the theorem given
above excludes leagues as fair structures, unless every player plays exactly
one match or there are only two players. We will next show that weakening
ET to WET extends the class of league-type competitions that are fair to
those where each player has the possibility to participate the same number of
times in at least |N |−1 matches. In particular, for m ≥ 1 being an integer, we
propose a seeding rule that lets each player participate in exactly m matches
8 and 4 with 5 in one branch, and 2 with 7 and 3 with 6 in the other branch of the binary
tree.
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against every other player. We call this class of competitions m-round-robin
tournaments, which includes as particular cases of single round-robin tour-
naments (m = 1) and double round-robin tournaments (m = 2).
Theorem 5 Any league-type competition (G,N) with |Λ(G)| = |N | or
|Λ(G)| = m · (|N | − 1) · |N | for some integer m ≥ 1 satisfies WET.
It should be noted that Theorem 5 is not vacuous in the sense that not
every league-type competition satisfies WET. For example, it is easy to check
that there is no way to seed three players in a two-match competition so that
WET is fulfilled.
5.2 Leagues and monotonicity in strength
The next result shows that the monotonicity in strength requirement restricts
the number of participants to two for league-type competitions, again illus-
trating an analogy between the results for elimination tournaments and for
leagues.
Theorem 6 A league-type competition system (G,N) satisfies MS if and
only if it is minimal.
When MS is weakened to WMS, the class of competition systems that are
fair is considerably enlarged because any league-type competition turns to
satisfy this axiom provided that either each player participates in exactly one
match or the total number of matches is at least |N | − 1. In particular, this
implies that any league competition covered by Theorem 5 satisfies the weak
versions of both the equal treatment and monotonicity in strength properties.
Theorem 7 Any league-type competition (G,N) with either |Λ(G)| = |N |
or |Λ(G)| ≥ 2 (|N | − 1) satisfies WMS.
It is not difficult to prove that the seeding used in the proof of Theorem
7 (see Appendix B) when |Λ(G)| = |N | is the only one for which (G,N)
satisfies WMS. However, there are other seedings that differ from those used
when |Λ(G)| ≥ 2(|N | − 1) holds, for which (G,N) satisfies WMS.
Although round-robin tournaments are certainly competitions where |Λ(G)| ≥
2(|N |−1) holds, the seeding rule that is used to prove the fulfilment of WMS
in this case does not correspond to a round-robin tournament. It is most
likely that league-type competitions also satisfy WMS with respect to the
round-robin tournament seeding. However, providing a formal proof is much
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more complex than what it may appear at first sight. Just to have an im-
pression with respect to the difficulties, we note that Saarinen et al. (2015)
shows that calculating the final winning probability in a round-robin tour-
nament is #P -complete even if all values in the probability matrix belong to
{0, 1/2, 1}.
Finally, it should be noted that Theorem 7 is not vacuous in the sense that
there exist league-type competitions that do not satisfy WMS. For example,
it can be proven that a league-type competition consisting of three matches
and five players does not satisfy WMS.
6 Concluding remarks and further research
The results that are presented in the current work enable the evaluation and
comparison of different competition systems on the basis of two reasonable
principles of fairness. Our model connects with the specific line of research
in Management Mathematics, which is devoted to the study of seeding pro-
cedures in elimination-type competitions with few players (cf. Horen and
Riezmann 1985, Hwang 1982, Prince et al. 2013, and Schwenk 2000). We
see as especially remarkable the way in which weak monotonicity leads to a
singular structure, which we have called an antler and which was found to
play a referential role in our analysis.
In general, our results show that there are limited numbers of competition
systems that are fair in the sense of simultaneously satisfying both types of
fairness in their corresponding strong or weak forms.
In the case of elimination-type competitions, MS already restricts the set
of fair competitions to the minimal ones so that no additional restriction is at
place when either ET or WET is added. Weakening MS to WMS (Theorem
3) does not heavily enlarge that set because the only balanced trees that are
antler-free are either elementary or balanced of height 2. Thus, replacing
MS by WMS in the above combinations adds only four-players balanced
competitions as “fair”.
In the case of leagues, MS combined with either ET or WET produces
again a degenerate competition consisting of a two-player league (Theorem
4). Weakening MS to WMS and imposing it together with ET slightly en-
larges the class of admissible leagues to those where each participant plays a
unique match. In contrast, the combination of WMS and WET results in an
expansion of the mentioned class of admissible leagues to include leagues al-
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lowing for players to participate the same number of times in at least |N |−1
matches (Theorems 5 and 7).
In Theorem 6, we prove that m-round-robin tournaments (which include
single and double round-robin tournaments as special cases) satisfy WET.
Most likely they also satisfy WMS, although the formal proof remains an
open question.
For possible extensions of our model, we note that the stochastic transi-
tivity condition assumed with respect to the probability matrices is sufficient
but not necessary for the associated binary relation of strength to be tran-
sitive. Notice that any weakening of this condition would result in a larger
number of probability matrices satisfying it and, thus, in even smaller class
of competition systems fulfilling the corresponding fairness axioms.
We have excluded from the analysis the possibility of random seedings
and reseedings, in addition to the study of double elimination competitions
and the typical two-stage competitions consisting of qualification parallel
round-robin tournaments followed by a knockout competition. However, we
believe that our model sets the fundamentals for approaching such problems.
Another intriguing extension of our setup concerns the analysis of com-
petition systems representable by forests of non-elementary binary trees. For
example, one could imagine a variant of a round-robin competition where,
at each round, the players do not play a single match but are grouped to
play four-player (or larger) knockout or stepladder competitions with the
final winner being the player who wins the most sub-competitions. David
(1959) considers “repeated knockout tournaments” as interesting systems to
be studied but, to the best of our knowledge, these kinds of competitions have
neither been applied in sports nor have they been theoretically analyzed.
A Appendix: Omitted proofs from Section 4
We start by noting that in elimination-type competitions, provided that two
players i and j are equally strong (pij = 0.5), it is always possible to exchange
the leaves they have been assigned by some seeding rule without affecting
the probabilities of winning of any player. The reason for this fact is simple
and it is based on condition (2), which implies that pik = pjk holds for each
k ∈ N \ {i, j}. Thus, we are generally allowed to fix a particular player from
those who are equally strong in a given situation without loss of generality.
Proof of Theorem 2. We first show that if N = {1, 2}, then (t, N) satisfies
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MS. Let p be an arbitrary but fixed probability matrix and note that s ∈
S(t,N) implies ϕ1(t, s,p) = p12 and ϕ2(t, s,p) = p21. Hence, p12 > 0.5 implies
ϕ1(t, s,p) > ϕ2(t, s,p) as required for MS to be satisfied.
Suppose now that (t, N) satisfies MS. We have to prove that |N | = 2 holds
in such a case. We split the proof into three steps referring to the possible
cases when t is not an elementary binary tree. In each of these steps, we
reach a contradiction by showing that (t, N) violates MS.
Step 1 If t is balanced with h(t) = 2, then (t, N) violates MS.
Proof. Note that by the definition of a feasible seeding rule, h(t) = 2 implies
that N consists of four players, N = {1, 2, 3, 4}. Consider the seeding rule
s ∈ S(t,N) assigning the players to the leaves of t in such a way that the initial
matches are between players 1 and 2, and 3 and 4, respectively. Take the
probability matrix p as specified below.
p =

0.5 0.85 0.86 0.90
0.5 0.60 0.70
0.5 0.60
0.5

We have ϕ2(t, s,p) = (p21·p34·p23)+(p21·p43·p24) = 0.096 and ϕ3(t, s,p) =
(p34 · p12 · p31) + (p34 · p21 · p32) = 0.1074. Thus, MS is violated since p23 =
0.60 > 0.5 and ϕ3(t, s,p) > ϕ2(t, s,p).
Step 2 If t is a stepladder with h(t) = 2, then (t, N) violates MS.
Proof. Again by the definition of a feasible seeding rule, h(t) = 2 implies that
N consists of three players, N = {1, 2, 3}. Consider the seeding rule s ∈ S(t,N)
assigning the players to the leaves of t in such a way that the initial match
is between player 1 and player 2. Let p be a probability matrix such that
p12 = 0.51, p13 = 0.53 and p23 = 0.52. Then ϕ2(t, s,p) = p12 · p23 = 0.2548
and ϕ3(t, s,p) = (p12 · p31) + (p21 · p32) = 0.4749. Thus, MS is violated since
p23 = 0.52 > 0.5 and ϕ3(t, s,p) > ϕ2(t, s,p).
Step 3 If t is such that h(t) > 1, then (t, N) violates MS.
Proof. Let Λh(t) be the set of all leaves of t at the maximal level h(t). Note
that one of the following two situations necessary happens: (i) there exists a
subtree t′ of t which is a stepladder with h(t′) = 2 and Λh(t
′) ⊆ Λh(t), or (ii)
there exists a balanced subtree t′′ of t with h(t′′) = 2 and Λh(t
′′) ⊆ Λh(t).
The reason for these two possibilities is as follows. Because t is a bi-
nary tree,
∣∣Λh(t)∣∣ ≥ 2. Take λ1, λ2 ∈ Λh(t) to be such that they have a
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common immediate predecessor and denote it by a. Again by t being a bi-
nary tree, a has a unique immediate predecessor, which we call b. Given
that b is not a leaf, it should have an intermediate successor a′ 6= a. There
are then two possibilities. First, if a′ has no successors, then the set of
nodes {λ1, λ2, a, b, a′} and the corresponding edges form a stepladder t′ with
h(t′) = 2 and Λh(t
′) = {λ1, λ2} ⊆ Λh(t). Second, if a′ does have successors,
then there are exactly two of them, which we call λ3 and λ4. Note that λ3
and λ4 are indeed leaves of t as by assumption, λ1, λ2 ∈ Λh(t). Hence, in
this case, the set of nodes {λ1, λ2, λ3, λ4, a, a′, b} and the corresponding edges
form a balanced tree t′′ with h(t′′) = 2 and Λh(t
′′) = {λ1, λ2, λ3, λ4} ⊆ Λh(t).
Let us now separately consider the two addressed possibilities:
Case (i) There exists a subtree t′ of t which is a stepladder with h(t′) = 2
and Λh(t
′) ⊆ Λh(t).
The situation in which t′ = t has already been considered in Step 2.
Therefore, we will assume that h(t) ≥ 3 holds. Let N = {1, . . . , n} and take
the seeding rule s ∈ S(t,N) assigning players 1, 2, and 3 to the leaves of t′ as
in the proof of Step 2. For any probability matrix p, denote by ϕw(t
′, s,p),
w ∈ {1, 2, 3}, the probability with which w wins the subcompetition t′. We
will prove that there exists a probability matrix p∗ such that p∗23 > 0.5 and
ϕ3(t, s,p
∗) > ϕ2(t, s,p∗).
For this, take p∗ to be such that p∗12 = 0.51, p
∗
13 = 0.53, p
∗
23 = 0.52. Note
that these are the same probability values that were previously used in the
proof of Step 2. Thus, we already know that ϕ3((t
′, {1, 2, 3}) , s,p∗|{1,2,3}) >
ϕ2((t
′, {1, 2, 3}) , s,p∗|{1,2,3}) though p∗23 > 0.5. Moreover, we further assume
that p∗2i > p
∗
3i and
p∗2i
p∗3i
≈ 1 holds for each i ∈ N \ {1, 2, 3}.
Let Vt′,t be the set of all nodes of t which are on the shortest path
from the root of t′ to the root of t. Note that for each v ∈ Vt′,t, `(v) ∈
{0, 1, . . . , h(t)− 2} with `(v) = 0 indicating that v is the root of t and
`(v) = h(t)− 2 indicating that node v is the root of t′. Because t is a binary
tree, each v ∈ Vt′,t has exactly one successor node v′ with `(v′) = `(v) + 1
and v′ ∈ V (t) \ Vt′,t. Clearly, v could either be a terminal node or not.
We denote by Λv′ the set of all leaves of t whose shortest path to the root
of t contains v′ and by Nv′ the set of players seeded by s to some leaf from
Λv′ . For k ∈ Nv′ , ϕv′k (t, s,p∗) stands for the probability with which a player
k seeded to a leaf from Λv′ reaches the node v
′.
Suppose now that some player w ∈ N has reached the node v ∈ Vt′,t
and let v ∈ Vt′,t be such that `(v) = `(v) + 1. Given the above additional
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notation, it is then clear that
∑
k∈Nv′
p∗wkϕ
v′
k (t, s,p
∗) expresses the probability
with which w reaches v. Hence,
ϕ2(t, s,p
∗) = ϕ2((t′, {1, 2, 3}) , s,p∗|{1,2,3}) ·
h(t)−2∏
v′:`(v′)=1
∑
k∈Nv′
p∗2kϕ
v′
k (t, s,p
∗)
and
ϕ3(t, s,p
∗) = ϕ3((t′, {1, 2, 3}) , s,p∗|{1,2,3}) ·
h(t)−2∏
v′:`(v′)=1
∑
k∈Nv′
p∗3kϕ
v′
k (t, s,p
∗).
We already know that ϕ3((t
′, {1, 2, 3}) , s,p∗|{1,2,3}) > ϕ2((t′, {1, 2, 3}) , s,p∗|{1,2,3})
and that p∗2k > p
∗
3k holds for each k ∈ N by construction. Moreover, since
p∗2i
p∗3i
≈ 1 holds for each i ∈ N \ {1, 2, 3}, we have
h(t)−2∏
v′:`(v′)=1
∑
k∈Nv′
p∗2kϕ
v′
k (t, s,p
∗) ≈
h(t)−2∏
v′:`(v′)=1
∑
k∈Nv′
p∗3kϕ
v′
k (t, s,p
∗)
and thus, ϕ3(t, s,p
∗) > ϕ2(t, s,p∗) holds. Because p∗23 > 0.5, we conclude
that (t, N) violates MS.
Case (ii) There exists a balanced subtree t′′ of t with h(t′′) = 2 and Λh(t
′′) ⊆
Λh(t).
Consider the seeding rule s ∈ S(t,N) assigning players 1, 2, 3, and 4 to the
leaves of t′′ in such a way that the initial matches are between players 1 and 2,
and 3 and 4, respectively. Let p∗ be such that p∗|{1,2,3,4} = p as defined in the
proof of Step 1. As already shown in Step 1, ϕ3((t
′′, {1, 2, 3, 4}) , s,p∗|{1,2,3,4}) >
ϕ2((t
′′, {1, 2, 3, 4}) , s,p∗|{1,2,3,4}). We can then further proceed as in the proof
of Case (i) showing that ϕ3(t, s,p
∗) > ϕ2(t, s,p∗) holds though p∗23 > 0.5.
Thus, (t, N) violates MS.
Proof of Lemma 1. The proof consists of the following tree steps.
Step 1 If t is symmetric-antler-free, then t ∈ ES2.
Proof. Let t be a symmetric-antler-free binary tree and suppose that t /∈ ES2.
The latter implies that t is an extended stepladder of degree x ≥ 3 with re-
spect to a maximal root-to-leaf path γ(t), as defined previously. Therefore,
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there exists a node v ∈ Vγ(t) and a leaf λ ∈ Λ−γ(tv) such that the distance
between v and λ is x. Denote by pi the path connecting v and λ. Let y
be the immediate successor of v in pi, y′ the immediate successor of y in pi
and y′′ the immediate successor of y′ in pi (notice that such nodes exist be-
cause x ≥ 3). Because t is a binary tree, y has another immediate successor
z′ 6= y′ and y′ has another immediate successor z′ 6= y′′. Meanwhile, given
that v ∈ Vγ(t) and that γ(t) is a maximal root-to-leaf path, there are at least
three consecutive successor nodes x, x′ and x′′ that belong to Vγ(t) (other-
wise, there would be a longer root-to-leaf path connecting the root with λ).
Again, since t is a binary tree, x has another immediate successor w′ 6= x′
and x′ has another immediate successor w′′ 6= y′′. Now, notice that the set of
nodes {v, x, y, x′, y′, x′′, y′′, z′, w′, z′′, w′′} and the corresponding edges form a
symmetric antler, which is a contradiction.
Step 2 If t is antler-free, then t ∈ ES∗2 .
Proof. Notice first that if t is antler-free then t is both symmetric-antler free
and asymmetric-antler free. Given that ES∗2 ⊂ ES2 and in view of Step 1 it
suffices to show that if t ∈ ES2 does not contain an asymmetric antler, then
t ∈ ES∗2 . Suppose not and let γ(t) be a maximal root-to-leaf path in t. If
t ∈ ES2 \ ES∗2 , then there are two nodes v, v′ ∈ Vγ(t) with `(v′) = `(v) + 1
and h−γ(tv) = h−γ(tv′) = 2.
Moreover, given that γ(t) is a maximal root-to-leaf path, v′ has at least
two consecutive successors x and x′ belonging to Vγ(t), and given that t is a
binary tree, x has another immediate successor y 6= x′. Consider then the
set of nodes consisting of v, v′, x, x′, y, the immediate successors of v and
v′, as well as the leaves in Λ−γ(tv) ∪ Λ−γ(tv′). Note that this set of nodes
together with the corresponding edges form an asymmetric antler, which is
a contradiction.
Step 3 If t ∈ ES∗2 , then t is antler-free.
Proof. Note first that if t ∈ ES1 ⊆ ES∗2 , then it is antler-free. Suppose then
that t is an extended stepladder of degree 2 belonging to ES∗2 . Clearly, t
does not contain a symmetric antler t′ because each symmetric antler is an
extended stepladder of degree 3 and, thus, t containing t′ implies that t should
be an extended stepladder of degree at least 3, which is a contradiction. Let
us show now that t ∈ ES∗2 implies that t does not contain an asymmetric
antler.
Suppose that, to the contrary, t contains an asymmetric antler tA. Let
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γ(t) and γ′(tA) be maximal root-to-leaf paths in t and tA, respectively. There
are two possibilities:
(i) Vγ′(tA)∩Vγ(t) = ∅. Consider the root vA0 of tA and the closest predecessor
v of vA0 such that v ∈ Vγ(t). Let d be the distance between vA0 and v. Then we
have that h−γ(tv) > d+ 3 in contradiction to t being an extended stepladder
of degree 2.
(ii) Vγ′(tA) ∩ Vγ(t) 6= ∅. Let Vγ′(tA) = {vA0 , vA1 , vA2 , vA3 } be such that, for
all i ∈ {1, 2, 3}, vAi is the immediate successor of vAi−1 and vA0 is the root
of tA. Given that Vγ′(tA) ∩ Vγ(t) 6= ∅ there exists vAi ∈ Vγ′(tA) ∩ Vγ(t). Note
that vAi ∈ Vγ(t) implies vAj ∈ Vγ(t) for all j < i. Therefore vA0 ∈ Vγ(t). We
distinguish then two cases: either vA0 ∈ Vγ(t) and vA1 /∈ Vγ(t) or vA0 , vA1 ∈ Vγ(t).
If vA0 ∈ Vγ(t) and vA1 /∈ Vγ(t), then h−γ(tvA0 ) ≥ 3 in contradiction to t being an
extended stepladder of degree 2. If vA0 , v
A
1 ∈ Vγ(t), then by the structure of
an asymmetric antler, and given that t is an extended stepladder of degree 2,
we know that h−γ(tvA0 ) = h−γ(tvA1 ) = 2, which is a contradiction to t ∈ ES∗2 .
Proof of Theorem 3. We start with two additional lemmas. Lemma 2 states
that a four-player balanced elimination-type competition satisfies WMS only
for the balanced seeding as defined in Section 4, while Lemma 3 shows that,
for a competition system to satisfy WMS, better players should not be seeded
to leaves that are further away from the root of the tree. The proof of Theo-
rem 3 is then structured as follows. We start with the previously mentioned
lemmas and their corresponding proofs, we then continue with the proof of
the sufficiency part of the theorem, and we conclude with the proof of the
necessity part.
Lemma 2 A balanced elimination-type competition system (t, N) with h(t) =
2 satisfies WMS with respect to a seeding rule s ∈ S(t,N) if and only if s = sb4.
Proof. Let (t, N) be as above with N = {1, 2, 3, 4} and recall that 1R2R3R4
holds. Assume, w.l.o.g., that sb4 is such that player 1 is matched with player
4 and player 2 is matched with player 3. Consider then the seeding rule
s = sb4 and fix any probability matrix p ∈ PR. We have to show that
ϕ1(t, sb4,p) ≥ ϕ2(t, sb4,p) ≥ ϕ3(t, sb4,p) ≥ ϕ4(t, sb4,p) holds.
Note first that for the final winner’s probabilities we have ϕ1(t, sb4,p) =
(p14 · p23 · p12) + (p14 · p32 · p13), ϕ2(t, sb4,p) = (p23 · p14 · p21) + (p23 · p41 · p24),
ϕ3(t, sb4,p) = (p32 · p14 · p31) + (p32 · p41 · p34), ϕ4(t, sb4,p) = (p41 · p23 · p42) +
(p41 · p32 · p43).
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First, when comparing ϕ1(t, sb4,p) with ϕ2(t, sb4,p) we have from p12 ≥
0.5 and condition (1) that p21 ≤ p12 holds. Thus, p14 · p23 · p12 ≥ p23 · p14 · p21.
In contrast, p14 ·p32 ·p13 ≥ p23 ·p41 ·p24 holds by p32 ≥ p41 (due to (3)) and by
p14 ≥ p24 and p13 ≥ p23 (following from p12 ≥ 0.5 and condition (2)). Thus,
ϕ1(t, sb4,p) ≥ ϕ2(t, sb4,p) holds.
Following analogous reasoning, it can be proven that ϕ2(t, sb4,p) > ϕ3(t, sb4,p)
and ϕ3(t, sb4,p) > ϕ4(t, sb4,p), concluding that (t, N) satisfies WMS with re-
spect to sb4.
Let us now consider a seeding rule s ∈ S(t,N) which differs from s 6= sb4.
Let ε > 0 be arbitrarily small and p ∈ PR be defined as follows:
p =

0.5 0.5 + ε 0.5 + 2ε 1− ε
0.5 0.5 + ε 1− 2ε
0.5 1− 3ε
0.5

There are two possible cases with respect to the seeding produced by s.
Case 1 (the initial matches are between 1 and 2, and 3 and 4, respectively).
We have in this case:
ϕ3(t, s,p) = (p34 ·p12 ·p31) + (p34 ·p21 ·p32) ≈ (1 ·0.5 ·0.5) + (1 ·0.5 ·0.5) ≈ 0.5
and
ϕ2(t, s,p) = (p21 ·p34 ·p23) + (p21 ·p43 ·p24) ≈ (0.5 ·1 ·0.5) + (0.5 ·0 ·1) ≈ 0.25,
in contradiction to p23 > 0.5 and (t, N) satisfying WMS.
Case 2 (the initial matches are between 1 and 3, and 2 and 4, respec-
tively). Considering again the probability matrix shown previously, we have
ϕ1(t, s,p) = (p13 ·p24 ·p12)+(p13 ·p42 ·p14) ≈ (0.5·1·0.5)+(0.5·0·1) ≈ 0.25 and
ϕ2(t, s,p) = (p24 ·p13 ·p21)+(p24 ·p31 ·p23) ≈ (1 ·0.5 ·0.5)+(1 ·0.5 ·0.5) ≈ 0.5,
which is in contradiction to p12 > 0.5 and (t, N) satisfying WMS.
Lemma 3 Let R be a strength relation defined on N , (t, N) an elimination-
type competition system, and s ∈ S(t,N). If (t, N) satisfies WMS with respect
to s, then `(λ) > `(λ′) for λ, λ′ ∈ Λ(t) implies s(λ′)Rs(λ).
Proof. Suppose that the implication is false. That is, given R, let (t, N)
satisfy WMS with respect to s such that s(λ)Ps(λ′) holds for some λ, λ′ ∈
Λ(t) with `(λ) > `(λ′). For (t, N) to satisfy WMS, it is necessary that
ϕs(λ)(t, s,p
′) ≥ ϕs(λ′)(t, s,p′) for all probability matrices p′ ∈ PR such that
p′s(λ),s(λ′) > 0.5. Let us consider a probability matrix p ∈ PR such that, for
all i, j ∈ N , pij ≈ 0.5 with ps(λ),s(λ′) > 0.5. Then ϕs(λ)(t, s,p) ≈ 0.5`(λ) and
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ϕs(λ′)(t, s,p) ≈ 0.5`(λ′). Because `(λ) > `(λ′), ϕs(λ)(t, s,p) < ϕs(λ′)(t, s,p).
Taking into account that ps(λ),s(λ′) > 0.5, the latter inequality implies that
(t, N) violates WMS with respect to s, which is a contradiction.
Before moving to the proof of the sufficiency and necessity parts of The-
orem 3, let us introduce the following additional concept. We say that a
binary tree t with h(t) = 3 is a one-bye antler, if |Λ(t)| = 7 with |Λ3(t)| = 6
and |Λ2(t)| = 1. Clearly, any one-bye antler is an extended stepladder of
degree 3. Further, for t and t′ being binary trees, we say that (1) t′ is an
extension from the leaves of t if t′ and t have the same root and Λ(t) ⊆ Λ(t′);
(2) t′ is an extension from the root of t if t is a subtree of t′; (3) t′ is a limited
extension from the root of t, if t is a subtree of t′ and Λh(t)(t) ⊆ Λh(t′)(t′).
Thus, a limited extension from the root of a tree t never has leaves at a height
that is greater than the height of any of the leaves of t.
Proof of Theorem 3 (Sufficiency). Given a strength relation R defined
on the player set N , then we have to prove that an elimination-type compe-
tition system (t, N) with t being antler-free satisfies WMS with respect to
sib.
Let (t, N) be such that t is antler-free and s = sib. By Lemma 1, t ∈ ES∗2 .
Take a maximal root-to-leaf path γ(t) and note that t ∈ ES∗2 irrespective of
the choice of γ(t). For s ∈ S(t,N), v ∈ Vγ(t), and any probability matrix p, we
denote by pvi (s) the probability with which player i ∈ N reaches v under a
given seeding s and by vh the unique leaf in Vγ(t). Moreover, we collect in the
set S1v(s) all players whose first match in the competition is against a player
who has already reached some v′ ∈ Vγ(t) with `(v′) > `(v); correspondingly,
S2v(s) stands for the set of all players who had to play an initial match before
having the possibility to meet a player who has already reached some node
from Vγ(t) at a higher level than v. Note that for each i ∈ N we have that,
due to t ∈ ES∗2 , either i = s(vh) or i ∈ S1v(s)∪S2v(s) holds for some v ∈ Vγ(t).
We denote by vx the closest predecessor belonging to Vγ(t) of x = s(λ)
for some λ ∈ Λ(t). Note that, for each v ∈ Vγ(t), any probability matrix p,
and any two players k, j ∈ N with pkj > 0.5 and s−1(k), s−1(j) ∈ Λ(tv), we
have that pvk(s) > p
v
j (s) implies ϕk(t, s,p) > ϕj(t, s,p). The reason is that
for each i ∈ N with s−1(i) ∈ Λ(tv) we have
ϕi(t, s,p) = p
v
i (s) ·
∏
x∈S1
v′ (s):`(v
′)<`(v)
pix ·
∏
y,z∈S2
v′ (s):`(v
′)<`(v)
(piypyz + pizpzy).
Hence, ϕk(t, s,p) > ϕj(t, s,p) is implied by p
v
k(s) > p
v
j (s), pkx ≥ pjx for each
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x ∈ N following from condition (2), and pyz (pzy) being independent of any
other parameter in the respective formulae for k and j.
Thus, to prove the sufficiency part of Theorem 3, let us now consider
the increasingly balanced rule sib. We have to show that (t, N) satisfies
WMS with respect to sib. In view of the argument that was just explained,
assuming that pkj > 0.5, then it is enough to find a node v ∈ Vγ(t) with
s−1ib (k), s
−1
ib (j) ∈ Λ(t) and pvk(sib) > pvj (sib). We distinguish the following
three possible cases:
(i) `(s−1ib (k)) < `(s
−1
ib (j)) and there is no m ∈ N with `(s−1ib (m)) =
`(s−1ib (k)). Clearly, player k does not need to win any match to reach v
k ∈
Vγ(t). Therefore, given that sib seeds worse players to higher levels, p
vk
k (sib) >
0.5 and because j has to defeat k to reach vk, pv
k
j (sib) < 0.5.
(ii) `(s−1ib (k)) < `(s
−1
ib (j)) and there exists m ∈ N with `(s−1ib (m)) =
`(s−1ib (k)). In this case, player k is involved in a balanced sub-competition of
four players. Let v∗ be the root of the sub-competition (note that v∗ ∈ Vγ(t)
with pv
∗
k (sib) being the probability for player k to win the sub-competition).
For player j, pv
∗
j (sib) is the product of two probabilities: the probability to
reach the sub-competition, that is, to reach the node v ∈ Vγ(t) such that
`(v) = `(s−1ib (k)); and, the probability to win the sub-competition. Given
that the sub-competition is played under a balanced seeding, we know by
Lemma 2 that for any probability matrix with pkj > 0.5, then the probability
for k to win the sub-competition is weakly greater than the one for j. We
conclude that pv
∗
k (sib) > p
v∗
j (sib) should hold.
(iii) `(s−1ib (k)) = `(s
−1
ib (j)). Also in this case, players k and j are involved
in a balanced sub-competition of four players. Following the same reasoning
as in (ii), we obtain pv
∗
k (sib) > p
v∗
j (sib).
Proof of Theorem 3 (Necessity). We have to prove that if (t, N) satisfies
WMS with respect to some seeding rule s, then t is antler-free and s = sib.
To prove that t is antler-free in such a case, we will show that if t contains
an antler, then the competition system (t, N) violates WMS. More precisely,
in Steps 1 to 9 of the proof, we show progressively and in an exhaustive way
that all of the different types of structures that can contain an antler violate
WMS. In Step 10 we finally prove that the seeding rule s with respect to
which (t, N) satisfies WMS is necessarily s = sib.
Step 1 Let (t, N) be an elimination-type competition system with t being a
symmetric antler. Then (t, N) violates WMS.
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Proof. Note that N = {1, . . . , 6} holds in this case. Let λ2` and λ2r be the
two leaves of t that are at level 2 of its left and right branch, respectively.
Similarly, let λ3a` and λ
3b
` be the two leaves at level 3 of t’s left branch, while
λ3ar and λ
3b
r be the two leaves at level 3 of t’s right branch. We proceed by
reduction to the absurd; that is, we assume that (t, N) satisfies WMS and
then prove that we reach a contradiction. By Lemma 3, any s ∈ S(t,N) with
respect to which (t, N) satisfies WMS should be such that the two strongest
players are seeded to λ2` and λ
2
r. Assume w.l.o.g. that these players are 1
and 2, and that s(λ2`) = 1 and s(λ
2
r) = 2. There are then six possible non-
equivalent seedings for the remaining players:
(i) s(λ3a` ) = 3, s(λ
3b
` ) = 4, s(λ
3a
r ) = 5, s(λ
3b
r ) = 6.
(ii) s(λ3a` ) = 3, s(λ
3b
` ) = 5, s(λ
3a
r ) = 4, s(λ
3b
r ) = 6.
(iii) s(λ3a` ) = 3, s(λ
3b
` ) = 6, s(λ
3a
r ) = 4, s(λ
3b
r ) = 5.
(iv) s(λ3a` ) = 4, s(λ
3b
` ) = 5, s(λ
3a
r ) = 3, s(λ
3b
r ) = 6.
(v) s(λ3a` ) = 4, s(λ
3b
` ) = 6, s(λ
3a
r ) = 3, s(λ
3b
r ) = 5.
(vi) s(λ3a` ) = 5, s(λ
3b
` ) = 6, s(λ
3a
r ) = 3, s(λ
3b
r ) = 4.
To prove that (t, N) violates WMS, we next show that for each of the
six possible seedings we can find a probability matrix p ∈ PR defined on N
such that there exists i ∈ N with pi−1,i > 0.5 (and, therefore, (i− 1)Pi) and
ϕi(t, s,p) > ϕi−1(t, s,p).
(i) Take p as follows: pjk > 0.5 if j < k; pj6 ≈ 1 for all j < 6, and pjk ≈ 0.5
for all j, k < 6. We have then ϕ5(t, s,p) ≈ 0.25 > 0.125 ≈ ϕ4(t, s,p) while
p45 > 0.5.
(ii) Consider the same probability matrix p as in case (i), then ϕ4(t, s,p) ≈
0.25 > 0.125 ≈ ϕ3(t, s,p) while p34 > 0.5.
(iii) Let p be such that pjk > 0.5 if j < k; pjk ≈ 1 if j ∈ {1, 2} and
k ∈ {4, 5, 6}, and pjk ≈ 0.5, otherwise. Then ϕ2(t, s,p) ≈ 0.5 > 0.375 ≈
ϕ1(t, s,p) while p12 > 0.5.
(iv) Take p as follows: pjk > 0.5 if j < k; pjk ≈ 1 if j ∈ {1, 2} and k = 6,
and pjk ≈ 0.5, otherwise. Then ϕ2(t, s,p) ≈ 0.375 > 0.25 ≈ ϕ1(t, s,p) while
p12 > 0.5.
(v) Let p be as follows: pjk > 0.5 if j < k; 1 ≈ p15 ≈ p16 ≈ p25 ≈
p26 ≈ p36 ≈ p46, and pjk ≈ 0.5, otherwise. Then ϕ2(t, s,p) ≈ 0.375 > 0.25 ≈
ϕ1(t, s,p) while p12 > 0.5.
(vi) Consider the same probability matrix p as in cases (i) and (ii), then
ϕ5(t, s,p) ≈ 0.25 > 0.125 ≈ ϕ4(t, s,p) while p45 > 0.5.
For later steps in the proof, it is important to remark that, according
to the probability matrices shown above and the one shown in the proof of
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Lemma 3, whatever seeding s ∈ S(t,N) we consider in a symmetric antler t,
not only exists a probability matrix p and i ∈ N such that pi−1,i > 0.5 and
ϕi(t, s,p) > ϕi−1(t, s,p) but it also holds that it is possible to find such a
matrix p where pi−1,i ≈ 0.5 and pik ≈ pi−1,k for all k ∈ N \ {i− 1, i}.
Step 2 Let (t, N) be an elimination-type competition system with t being an
asymmetric antler, then (t, N) violates WMS.
Proof. Clearly N = {1, . . . , 6} holds also in this case. Assume w.l.o.g. that
t’s left branch has four leaves at level h(t) = 3, and denote them (from left
to right) by λ3a` , λ
3b
` , λ
3c
` and λ
3d
` . Clearly, t’s right branch has two leaves
(λ2ar and λ
2b
r ) at level 2. Let v1 be the node in the left branch of t which is
an immediate successor of the root of t. Note that {λ3a` , λ3b` , λ3c` , λ3d` } are the
leaves of the balanced subtree t1 of t whose root is v1. We proceed again by
reduction to the absurd. Assume that (t, N) satisfies WMS. By Lemma 3, the
two strongest players should be seeded to the two leaves at level 2. Assume
w.l.o.g. that these players are 1 and 2 and that s(λ2`) = 1 and s(λ
2
r) = 2.
We then fix a seeding rule s′ : Λ(t1)→ {3, 4, 5, 6}, note that s′ ∈ S(t1,N\{1,2}),
and consider the following two possibilities.
Case 1 (s′ 6= s′b4). Consider the matrix used in the proof of Lemma 2
and apply it to the set of players {3, 4, 5, 6}. According to the proof, if
s 6= sb4, then we can always find a pair of players i, i − 1 ∈ {3, 4, 5, 6} and
a probability matrix p′ ∈ PR|{3,4,5,6} such that p′i−1,i > 0.5 and p′v1i > p′v1i−1.
Moreover p′i−1,i ≈ 0.5 and p′i−1,k ≈ p′i,k also holds for all k ∈ {3, 4, 5, 6}. Let
p be defined on N such that pjk = p
′
jk for all j, k > 2; p13 = p23 = p12 = 0.5
and, therefore, pjk = p3k for all j < 3 and all k ∈ N . By pi3 ≈ pi−1,3 and
by p satisfying condition (2) we have pi2 ≈ pi−1,2 and pi1 ≈ pi−1,1. Thus,
pi−1,k ≈ pi,k for all k ∈ N .
Note then that ϕi(t, s,p) = p
′v1
i · (p12pi1 + p21pi2) and ϕi−1(t, s,p) =
p′v1i−1 · (p12pi−1,1 + p21pi−1,2). By p′v1i > p′v1i−1, pi1 ≈ pi−1,1 and pi2 ≈ pi−1,2, we
have ϕi(t, s,p) > ϕi−1(t, s,p) in contradiction to (t, N) satisfying WMS with
respect to s.
Case 2 (s′ = s′b4). Consider the following probability matrix p ∈ PR:
p =

0.5 0.5 0.5 + ε 1− 2ε 1− ε 1− ε
0.5 0.5 + ε 1− 2ε 1− ε 1− ε
0.5 1− 3ε 1− 2ε 1− 2ε
0.5 1− 3ε 1− 3ε
0.5 0.5
0.5

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According to p, s′b4 matches either 3 with 6 and 4 with 5, or it matches 3
with 5 and 4 with 6. In either case, we have p23 > 0.5 and, after making the
necessary computations, ϕ3(t, s,p) ≈ 0.5 > 0.25 ≈ ϕ2(t, s,p). Thus, (t, N)
violates WMS with respect to s.
As in Step 1, it is important to remark that, according to the probability
matrix shown previously and the ones shown in the proofs of Lemma 2 and
Lemma 3, whatever seeding s ∈ S(t,N) we consider in an asymmetric antler
t, not only exists a probability matrix p and i ∈ N such that pi−1,i > 0.5
and ϕi(t, s,p) > ϕi−1(t, s,p) but it also holds that it is possible to find such
a matrix p where pi−1,i ≈ 0.5 and pik ≈ pi−1,k for all k ∈ N \ {i− 1, i}.
Step 3 Let (t, N) be an elimination-type competition system with t being a
one-bye antler. Then (t, N) violates WMS.
Proof. We proceed again by reduction to the absurd assuming that (t, N)
violates WMS. Note that N = {1, . . . , 7} holds in this case. Assume w.l.o.g.
that t’s left branch has four leaves at level h(t) = 3, and denote them (from
left to right) by λ3a` , λ
3b
` , λ
3c
` and λ
3d
` . Clearly, t’s right branch has two leaves
(λ3ar and λ
3b
r ) at that same level and one leaf (λ
2
r) at level 2. By Lemma
3, the best player should be seeded to λ2r. Assume w.l.o.g. that s(λ
2
r) = 1.
We distinguish now two possibilities depending on the leaf player 7 has been
seeded at.
Case 1 (s(λ) = 7 for some λ of t’s right branch). There are two subcases:
(i) s(λ4ar ) = 6 and s(λ
4b
r ) = 7 (or vice versa w.l.o.g.) and (ii): s(λ
4a
r ) = x and
s(λ4br ) = 7 (or vice versa) with x < 6.
(i) If s(λ4ar ) = 6 and s(λ
4b
r ) = 7, then let p ∈ PR be a probability matrix
such that pjk > 0.5 for all j, k ∈ N with j < k, pj7 ≈ 1 for all j ∈ N \ {7},
and pjk ≈ 0.5 for all j, k ∈ N \ {7}. By making the necessary calculations,
we obtain ϕ6(t, s,p) ≈ 0.25 > 0.125 ≈ ϕ5(t, s,p) while p67 > 0.5, which is a
contradiction to (t, N) satisfying WMS.
(ii) If s(λ4ar ) = x and s(λ
4b
r ) = 7, then let p ∈ PR be a probability matrix
such that pjk > 0.5 for all j, k ∈ N with j < k, pjk ≈ 0.5 for all j, k ∈ N \{1},
and p1k = 0.7 for all k ∈ N \ {1}. By making the necessary calculations,
we obtain ϕ6(t, s,p) ≈ 0.09 > 0.075 ≈ ϕx(t, s,p) while px6 > 0.5, reaching
again a contradiction.
Case 2 (s(λ) = 7 for some λ of t’s left branch). Let x be the player whose
initial match is against player 7 and suppose w.l.o.g., that s(λ4c` ) = 7 and
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s(λ4d` ) = x. Then remove from t the nodes λ
4c
` and λ
4d
` , and also the corre-
sponding edges to their immediate predecessor vλ. Note that the remaining
subgraph tA of t is a symmetric antler with vλ being now a leaf of t
A. Con-
sider the seeding rule s′ : Λ(tA) → {1, . . . , 6} defined as follows: s′(vλ) = x
and s′(λ) = s(λ) for each λ ∈ Λ(tA) \ {vλ}, and note that s′ ∈ S(tA,N\{7}). In
other words, s′ can be interpreted as a situation in which x wins his or her
match against 7 and the remaining matches are not yet played.
By Step 1, the competition system (tA, N \ {7}) violates WMS. That is,
there exists a probability matrix p′ ∈ PR|N\{7} such that, for some i ∈ N \{7},
p′i−1,i > 0.5 and ϕ
′
i(t
A, s′,p′) > ϕ′i−1(t
A, s′,p′). Moreover, we know that p′
can be constructed in such a way that p′i−1,i ≈ 0.5 and p′ik ≈ p′i−1,k holds for
each k ∈ N \ {i− 1, i, 7}.
Consider now the probability matrix p ∈ PR such that pjk = p′jk for all
j, k ∈ N \ {7}, and pk7 ≈ 1 for all k ∈ N \ {7}. For the final winning proba-
bilities of each k < 7 we have by construction that ϕk(t, s,p) ≈ ϕ′k(tA, s′,p′).
By hypothesis, p′i−1,i > 0.5 and ϕ
′
i(t
A, s′,p′) > ϕ′i−1(t
A, s′,p′) holds and, thus,
pi−1,i > 0.5 and ϕi(t, s,p) > ϕi−1(t, s,p) holds as well. Hence, (t, N) also
violates WMS in this case. Moreover, as in Step 1, it is interesting to remark
for the later steps in the proof that, for any seeding in a one-bye antler t,
we can always find a probability matrix p ∈ PR that makes the competition
system (t, N) violate WMS and such that pi−1,i ≈ 0.5 and pik ≈ pi−1,k hold-
ing for some i ∈ N and all k ∈ N \ {i− 1, i}.
Step 4 Let (t, N) be an elimination-type competition system with h(t) = 3
and t being balanced. Then (t, N) violates WMS.
Proof. Note that N = {1, . . . , 8} holds in this case. Let x be the player whose
initial match is against player 8, and remove from t the nodes s−1(8) and
s−1(x) together with the corresponding edges to their immediate predecessor,
vλ. Note that the remaining subgraph t
A of t is a one-bye antler with vλ being
now a leaf of tA. Consider then the seeding rule s′ : Λ(tA) → {1, . . . , 7}
defined as follows: s′(vλ) = x and s′(λ) = s(λ) for each λ ∈ Λ(tA)\{vλ}, and
notice that s′ ∈ S(tA,N\{8}).
By Step 3, (tA, N \{8}) violates WMS. That is, there exists a probability
matrix p′ ∈ PR|N\{8} such that p′ij > 0.5 and ϕ′j(tA, s′,p′) > ϕ′i(tA, s′,p′)
for the corresponding final winning probabilities of some i, j ∈ N \ {8}.
Moreover, we know that p′ can be constructed in such a way that p′ij ≈ 0.5
and p′ik ≈ p′jk holds for each k ∈ N \ {8}.
Consider now the probability matrix p defined on N such that pjk ≈
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p′jk holds for all j, k < 8 and pk8 ≈ 1 holds for all k < 8. For the final
winning probabilities of each k < 8 we have by construction that ϕk(t, s,p) ≈
ϕ′k(t
A, s′,p′). Therefore, pij > 0.5 and ϕj(t, s,p) > ϕi(t, s,p) as it is required
to prove that the competition system (t, N) violates WMS. Moreover, by
construction, p is such that pij ≈ 0.5 and pik ≈ pjk for each k ∈ N .
Step 5 Let (t, N) be an elimination-type competition system with t being a
limited extension from the root of an antler. Then (t, N) violates WMS.
Proof. Let tA be the (symmetric or asymmetric) antler contained in t and fix
any s ∈ S(t,N). Because s is arbitrary, to show that (t, N) violates WMS, it
suffices to show that the violation holds with respect to s. Let N ′tA(s) be the
set of players seeded by s to a leaf of tA. For notational convenience, when
i ∈ N ′tA(s) we will label this player as i′.
By Lemma 3, Step 1 in the case of symmetric antlers, and Step 2 in
the case of asymmetric antlers, we know that for any seeding in tA we can
find a probability matrix p ∈ PR|N′
tA
(s)
that makes
(
tA, N
)
violate WMS. In
particular, for s′ = s|Λ(tA), there exists a matrix p′ and players i′, h′ ∈ N ′tA(s)
with p′h′,i′ > 0.5 and ϕi′(t
A, s′,p′) > ϕh′(tA, s′,p′). Moreover, we know that
p′ can be constructed in such a way that p′h′,i′ ≈ 0.5 and p′h′,k′ ≈ p′i′,k′ holding
for each k′ ∈ N ′tA(s).
Now, for all k ∈ N \N ′tA(s) let sup(k) = min{x′ ∈ N ′tA(s) such that x′ >
k} and inf(k) = max{x′ ∈ N ′tA(s) such that x′ < k}.
Let us define a probability matrix p on N such that (1) for all x′, y′ ∈
N ′tA(s), px′y′ = p
′
x′y′ ; (2) for all k ∈ N \ N ′tA(s) such that sup(k) exists,
pk,sup(k) = 0.5 (and pkw = psup(k),w for each w ∈ N); (3) for all k ∈ N ′tA(s)
such that sup(k) does not exist, pk,inf(k) = 0.5 (and pkw = pinf(k),w for each
w ∈ N).
In other words, p restricted to the elements of N ′tA(s) is equal to p
′, and
all the players that are not seeded to tA are assimilated as equally strong as
his or her immediately weaker player in N ′tA(s). Moreover, if for some element
k not seeded to tA there is no weaker player in N ′tA(s), then k is considered
as equally strong as his or her immediately stronger player in N ′tA(s). Thus,
by construction, p ∈ PR.
Note that, by p′h′w′ ≈ p′i′w′ for each w′ ∈ N ′tA(s), we have by construction
that ph′w ≈ pi′w holds for each w ∈ N .
Now, let Vv0,vA0 be the set of nodes of the shortest path between the
root v0 of t and the root v
A
0 of t
A. Note that, due to t being a binary
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tree, for each v ∈ Vv0,vA0 with `(v) ≥ 1 there always exists a unique node
v′ /∈ Vv0,vA0 with ` (v′) = `(v) at distance 2 from v. That is, the two players
having reached these two nodes play against each other to arrive at their
common immediate predecessor v′′ ∈ Vv0,vA0 with ` (v′′) = `(v)−1. By letting
Nv′ be the set of all players seeded by s to some leaf of the subtree of t
rooted at v′, we get ϕi(t, s,p) = ϕi′(tA, s′,p′) ·
∏
v∈V
v0,v
A
0
,`(v)≥1
∑
k∈Nv′
pi′kp
v′
k and
ϕh(t, s,p) = ϕh′(t
A, s′,p′) · ∏
v∈V
v0,v
A
0
,`(v)≥1
∑
k∈Nv′
ph′kp
v′
k .
Recall that pi′,w ≈ ph′,w holds for each w ∈ N . Moreover, pv′k is in-
dependent of whether i′ or h′ have reached node v ∈ Vv0,vA0 . Therefore,
ϕi′(t
A, s′,p′) > ϕh′(tA, s′,p′) implies ϕi(t, s,p) > ϕh(t, s,p). Thus, the com-
petition system (t, N) violates WMS.
Step 6 Let (t, N) be an elimination-type competition system with t being
a limited extension from the root of a one-bye antler. Then (t, N) violates
WMS.
The proof is analogous to the proof of Step 5.
Step 7 Let (t, N) be an elimination-type competition system with t being a
limited extension from the root of a balanced tree of height 3. Then, (t, N)
violates WMS.
Again, the proof is analogous to that of Step 5.
Step 8 Let t∗ be a limited extension from the root of an antler tA and (t, N)
be an elimination-type competition system with t being an extension from
the leaves of t∗. Then, (t, N) violates WMS.
Proof. For the proof of the statement of Step 8, we will need the following
additional notation.
Let d(v0, v
A
0 ) stand for the geodesic distance between the root v0 of t and
the root vA0 of t
A. For x ∈ {0, . . . , h(t)− d(v0, vA0 )} , we denote by tx0 the
subgraph of t consisting of all nodes v ∈ V (t) with `(v) ≤ d(v0, vA0 ) + x and
the corresponding edges of t connecting them. That is, tx0 is just the tree t
when being truncated at level d(v0, v
A
0 ) + x. Clearly, x = h(t
A) = 3 implies
tx0 = t
∗.
We denote by Mx the set of matches at level d(v0, v
A
0 ) + x of t
x
0 (with m
x
being a typical element of Mx), and by T xk the set of subgraphs of t
x
0 that can
be obtained from tx0 by removing a number k of matches at level d(v0, v
A
0 )+x
(with txk being a typical element of T
x
k ). Clearly, T
x
|Mx| = t
x
|Mx| = t
x−1
0 .
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Moreover, for any tree txk ∈ T xk we consider a set of players Nxk =
{1, . . . , nxk} that makes competition (txk, Nxk ) feasible; that is, a set of players
whose cardinality is nxk = |Λ(txk)|.
Consider now, for any k ≤ |M4|, any tree t4k ∈ T 4k and the corresponding
set of players N4k that makes (t
4
k, N
4
k ) feasible. Let R be the ordering of
strength defined on N4k . Assume that (t
4
k, N
4
k ) satisfies WMS. By Lemma
3 we know that, for t4k to satisfy WMS with respect to some seeding rule
s ∈ S(t4k,N4k), the worst player according to R should be seeded to some leaf
of t4k that belongs to some match in M
4. If the worst player is not unique,
then assume w.l.o.g. that the selected player is n4k. Let us denote by m
′4
the match to which n4k is seeded, by (λ
′4
a ) and (λ
′4
b ) its two leaves, and by
(n4k) 6= n4k the second player seeded to m′4; that is, the opponent of n4k. Now,
let (t′4k+1, N
4
k+1) be the competition system in which t
′4
k+1 has been obtained
from t4k by removing the match m
′4 and N4k+1 is a set of nk − 1 players.
Clearly, the common immediate predecessor w of λ′4a and λ
′4
b becomes now a
leaf of t′4k+1 to be denoted by λw. Hence, Λ(t
′4
k+1) = Λ(t
4
k) ∪ {λw} \ {λ′4a , λ′4b }.
The inductive reasoning starts by proving that, roughly speaking, if the
competition (t4k, N
4
k ) satisfies WMS and the match where the worst player is
seeded at is removed, then the remaining structure also satisfies WMS.
Claim Let (t4k, N
4
k ) and (t
′4
k+1, N
4
k+1) be as above. If (t
4
k, N
4
k ) satisfies WMS,
then (t′4k+1, N
4
k+1) also satisfies WMS.
Proof of the Claim. Assume that (t4k, N
4
k ) satisfies WMS but (t
′4
k+1, N
4
k+1) does
not. Let R′ be defined on N4k+1 such that R
′ = R|N4k+1\{n4k}. Consider the
seeding rule s′ : Λ(t′4k+1) → N4k+1 defined as follows: for each λ ∈ Λ(t′4k+1) \
{λw}, s′(λ) = s(λ) and s(λw) = n4k (note that N4k+1 = N4k \ {n4k} and that
n4k ∈ N4k+1). That is, s′ can be interpreted as a situation in which n4k wins
his match against n4k and the remaining matches are not yet played. By
hypothesis (t′4k+1, N
4
k+1) violates WMS. This implies that for the seeding rule
s′ there exists some probability matrix p′ ∈ PR′ defined on N4k+1 such that
p′ij > 0.5 and ϕj(t
′4
k+1, s
′,p′) > ϕi(t′4k+1, s
′,p′) holds for some i, j ∈ N4k+1.
Let p be a probability matrix on N4k , which is defined as follows: pij =
p′ij for all i, j ∈ N4k \ {n4k}, and pi,n4k ≈ 1 for each i ∈ N4k \ {n4k}. Note
that p ∈ PR|N4
k
by construction. Also by construction, ϕi(t
′4
k+1, s
′,p′) ≈
ϕi(t
4
k, s,p) holds for each i ∈ N4k\{n4k}. Therefore, pij > 0.5 and ϕj(t4k, s,p) >
ϕi(t
4
k, s,p) holds for some i, j ∈ N4k . Hence, we have a contradiction to the
hypothesis that (t4k, N
4
k ) satisfies WMS, which completes the proof of the
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claim.
Note that this claim holds also for k + 1 = |M4|. In this particular case,
tk+1 = t
4
|M4| = t
3
0 = t
∗ which leaves us with the following three possibilities:
(i) There are two leaves at distance 2 from vA0 ; that is, there is no extension
from any leaf at distance 2 from vA0 and, therefore, t
∗ is a limited extension
from the root of a (symmetric or asymmetric) antler.
(ii) There is a unique leaf at distance 2 from vA0 . In this case, t
∗ is a
limited extension from the root of a one-bye antler.
(iii) There are no leaves at distance 2 from vA0 . In this case, t
∗ is a limited
extension from the root of a balanced tree of height 3.
For each of these three possible cases, we have proven in the previous steps
that no competition system whose graph is t∗ = t4|M4| does satisfy WMS.
Now, for any k ∈ {0, . . . , |M4|−1}, take any competition system (t4k, N4k )
with t4k ∈ T 4k . Note that from (t4k, N4k ) it is always possible to define a
sequence (t4k, N
4
k ), (t
4
k+1, N
4
k+1), . . . , (t
4
|M4|, N
4
|M4|) by removing the match at
level d(v0, v
A
0 )+4 where the corresponding worst player n
4
k, n
4
k+1, . . ., n
4
|M4|−1
has been seeded. Given that (t4|M4|, N
4
|M4|) violates WMS, and considering
the Claim, an inductive argument also allows to prove that (t4k, N
4
k ) vio-
lates WMS. Therefore, in particular, (t40, N
4
0 ) violates WMS. Recalling that
t5|M5| = t
4
0, we can recursively replicate the inductive argument at level
d(v0, v
A
0 ) + 5 to conclude that for all k ∈ {0, 1, . . . , |M5| − 1}, every com-
petition system (t5k, N
5
k ) with t
5
k ∈ T 5k violates WMS. The reasoning can be
successively applied when t has been truncated at higher levels, until we
reach the tree t = t
h(t)−d(v0,vA0 )
0 , which proves that the competition system
(t, N) violates WMS.
Step 9 Let (t, N) be an elimination-type competition with t containing an
antler. Then, (t, N) violates WMS.
Proof. The statement follows from the fact that if a tree t contains an
antler, then, clearly, it is some form of extension from the leaves of a limited
extension from the root of an antler and by Step 8.
Step 10 Let (t, N) be an elimination-type competition with t being antler-
free. Then, (t, N) satisfies WMS with respect to s ∈ S(t,N) only if s = sib.
Proof. We proceed by reduction to the absurd. We assume that (t, N)
satisfies WMS, s 6= sib, and show that this leads to a contradiction. In other
words, we show that, given a strength ordering R defined on N , it is possible
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to find a probability matrix p ∈ PR such that if s 6= sib then there exist
i, j ∈ N such that pij > 0.5 but ϕi(t, s,p) < ϕj(t, s,p).
We know from Lemma 3 that for (t, N) to satisfy WMS, it should be the
case that for any probability matrix p, and any λ, λ′ ∈ Λ(t), `(λ) < `(λ′)
implies ps(λ),s(λ′) ≥ 0.5. Moreover, by Lemma 1, t ∈ ES∗2 . Take now a
maximal root-to-leaf path γ(t) and note that for any probability matrix p,
s 6= sib implies either that
(i) There exist leaves λa, λb ∈ Λ(t) with `(λa) = `(λb) < h(t) such
that: (1) only λa has an immediate predecessor belonging to Vγ(t) and (2)
ps(λb),s(λa) > 0.5, or that
(ii)
∣∣Λh(t)(t)∣∣ = 4 with the players in {s(λ) : λ ∈ Λh(t)(t)} not being seeded
in a balanced way.
We proceed by showing that in both cases we reach a contradiction.
Case (i) Let k be the number of players seeded by s to leaves at higher level
than `(λa) = `(λb). We construct the desired p in three steps.
First, we set pn−k,n−k+1 > 0.5 and pn−k+1,z ≈ 1 to hold for each z >
n−k+ 1. By Lemma 3, the set of players seeded to the leaves at higher level
than `(λa) is {n, n− 1, . . . , n− k + 1}. Thus, the probability pvs(λa)n−k+1 with
which player n− k + 1 reaches node vs(λa) ∈ Vγ(t) is arbitrarily close to 1.
Second, let x1, x2, and x3 be the three players seeded to the three leaves at
level `(λa) and set px1x2 ≥ 0.5 and px2x3 ≥ 0.5. By construction, px3,(n−k+1) >
0.5. Note also that, with a probability arbitrary close to 1, the players
(n − k + 1), x1, x2, and x3 play a balanced sub-competition at level `(λa)
with the root of the sub-competition being v ∈ Vγ(t) with `(v) = `(λa) − 2.
Moreover, by hypothesis, n−k+ 1 plays a match against some player xi (i ∈
{2, 3}) such that px1xi > 0.5. Therefore, by Lemma 2, it is possible to define
a probability matrix p′ on the player set {n−k+1, x1, x2, x3} such that there
are players i, j ∈ {n−k+1, x1, x2, x3} with p′ij > 0.5 and p′vi < p′vj . Moreover,
we know by the proof of Lemma 2 that p′ can always be constructed in
such a way that p′iw ≈ p′jw holds for each w ∈ {n − k + 1, x1, x2, x3}. We
then take pxy = p
′
xy to hold for all x, y ∈ {n − k + 1, x1, x2, x3}. This
implies that, according to p, pvi < p
v
j . It also implies piw ≈ pjw for each
w ∈ {n− k + 1, x1, x2, x3}.
Third, we take pzx1 = 0.5 to hold for each z ∈ N who is seeded at a
lower level than `(λa). That is, every player who is seeded at a lower level
than `(λa) is considered as being equally strong as the strongest player at
level `(λa). Note that the latter fact together with pn−k+1,z ≈ 1 for each
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z > n− k + 1 implies piw ≈ pjw for each w ∈ N .
In summary, the constructed probability matrix p is as follows: the re-
striction of p on the player set {n − k + 1, x1, x2, x3} is p′; x1 is equally
strong as every player who is seeded at lower levels; and, each player in
{n−k+ 1, x1, x2, x3} wins with a probability arbitrarily close to 1 the match
against any player being seeded at higher levels and is different from n−k+1.
Now, by using the notation of Step 1 and recalling that `(v) = `(λa)− 2, we
have
ϕi(t, s,p) = p
v
i (s) ·
∏
x∈S1
v′ (s),`(v
′)<`(v)
pix ·
∏
y,z∈S2
v′ (s),`(v
′)<`(v)
(piypyz + pizpzy)
and
ϕj(t, s,p) = p
v
j (s) ·
∏
x∈S1
v′ (s),`(v
′)<`(v)
pjx ·
∏
y,z∈S2
v′ (s),`(v
′)<`(v)
(pjypyz + pjzpzy).
Then, we have that pvj > p
v
i , pix ≈ pjx for each x ∈ N , and because pyz
(pzy) is independent of any other parameter in the respective formulae for i
and j, we conclude that ϕj(t, s,p) > ϕi(t, s,p) should also hold, which is in
contradiction to (t, N) satisfying WMS with respect to s in this case.
Case (ii) Note that in this case
∣∣Λh(t)∣∣ = 4 implies that the node v ∈ Vγ(t)
with `(v) = h(t)− 2 is the root of a balanced subtree of t. We construct the
desired p in two steps.
First, let {a, b, c, d} ⊆ N be the set of players seeded to the leaves in
Λh(t). It follows then from Lemma 2 that, for each of the two possible non-
balanced seedings of the players in {a, b, c, d} to the leaves in Λh(t), there
exists a probability matrix p′ on {a, b, c, d} such that p′ij > 0.5 and p′vj > p′vi
holds for some i, j ∈ {a, b, c, d}. Moreover, it follows from the proof of Lemma
2 that p′ can be constructed in such a way that p′ij ≈ 0.5 and p′iw ≈ p′jw for
each w ∈ {a, b, c, d}. Thus, we take p to be such that pxy = p′xy for all
x, y ∈ {a, b, c, d}. Let a be a strongest player and d a weakest player among
those in {a, b, c, d}. By Lemma 3, for all players x ∈ N \ {a, b, c, d} and
i ∈ {a, b, c, d}, pxi ≥ 0.5.
Second, we set pzw = 0.5 to hold for all z, w ∈ N \ {b, c, d}.
Thus, p is as follows: the restriction of p on the player set {a, b, c, d} is
p′, while each of the remaining players (who are seeded to leaves at lower
levels that h(t) in the tree) is considered as equally strong as the strongest
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player in {a, b, c, d}. Moreover, p′iw ≈ p′jw holding for each w ∈ {a, b, c, d}
implies by construction that piw ≈ pjw is also true for each w ∈ N .
By using the notation of Step 1 and recalling that `(v) = h(t) − 2, we
have
ϕi(t, s,p) = p
v
i (s) ·
∏
x∈S1
v′ (s):`(v
′)<`(v)
pix ·
∏
y,z∈S2
v′ (s):`(v
′)<`(v)
(piypyz + pizpzy)
and
ϕj(t, s,p) = p
v
j (s) ·
∏
x∈S1
v′ (s):`(v
′)<`(v)
pjx ·
∏
y,z∈S2
v′ (s):`(v
′)<`(v)
(pjypyz + pjzpzy).
Again we have that pvj > p
v
i , pix ≈ pjx for each x ∈ N , and because pyz
(pzy) is independent of any other parameter in the respective formulae for i
and j, we conclude that ϕj(t, s,p) > ϕi(t, s,p) holds. Thus, we have again
a contradiction to (t, N) satisfying WMS with respect to s. This completes
the proof of Theorem 3.
B Appendix: Omitted proofs from Section 5
We start by introducing some additional notation and remarks. Recall that,
given a competition (G,N), wt denotes the player who reaches the root of the
binary tree t ∈ G. Moreover, i ∈ N is a winner of the competition (G,N) if
|{t ∈ G : wt = i}| ≥ |{t ∈ G : wt = j}| holds for all j ∈ N . For every t ∈ G,
λt and λ
′
t denote the two leaves of t. Then, given G = {t1, t2, . . . , t#G}
and s ∈ S(G,N), w = (wt1 , wt2 , . . . , wt#G) stands for the corresponding vec-
tor or configuration of tree winners, where wt ∈ {s(λt), s(λ′t)} holds for
each t ∈ G. Given s ∈ S(G,N) and a probability matrix p, the proba-
bility pr(w) for the occurrence of a configuration w is given by pr(w) =∏
t∈G
ϕwt(t, s,p). Then, for each i ∈ N , ϕi(G, s,p) can be expressed by
ϕi(G, s,p) =
∑
w∈W[i]
pr(w) =
∑
w∈W[i]
∏
t∈G
ϕwt(t, s,p), where W[i] stands for the
set of all configurations for which i is the final winner of the competition.
Additionally, when the probability matrix p is such that pij = 0.5 holds for
all i, j ∈ N , we have pr(w) = (0.5)#G for each configuration of tree winners,
and ϕi(G, s,p) = (0.5)
#G · ∣∣W[i]∣∣ holding for each i ∈ N .
Proof of Theorem 4. Let (G,N) be a league-type competition system with
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either |Λ(G)| = |N | or |Λ(G)| > |N | = 2. We show first that (G,N) satisfies
ET. Let s ∈ S(G,N) be an arbitrary but fixed seeding rule and p the probabil-
ity matrix with pij = 0.5 for all i, j ∈ N . Notice then that each player from
N participates either in exactly one match (when |Λ(G)| = |N |) or there are
only two players who participate in all matches (when |Λ(G)| > |N | = 2).
Let us consider the following cases separately.
Case 1 (|Λ(G)| > |N | = 2 and #G is odd). Let N = {1, 2} and notice
that in this case we have ϕ1(G, s,p) = (0.5)
#G · ∣∣W[1]∣∣ and ϕ2(G, s,p) =
(0.5)#G · ∣∣W[2]∣∣. By #G being odd, w ∈ W[1] implies w /∈ W[2], and w ∈ W[2]
implies w /∈ W[1]. Thus, W[1] ∩ W[2] = ∅. Finally, by N = {1, 2} and
W[1] ∩W[2] = ∅, we can define a bijection f : W[1] → W[2] by just replacing
1 by 2 and 2 by 1 as tree winners at each w ∈ W[1] as to get f(w) ∈ W[2].
Thus
∣∣W[1]∣∣ = ∣∣W[2]∣∣ and ϕ1(G, s,p) = ϕ2(G, s,p) holds. We conclude then
that (G,N) satisfies ET.
Case 2 (|Λ(G)| > |N | = 2 and #G is even). Notice that in this case W[1] ∩
W[2] 6= ∅. We have then that w ∈ W[1] \W[2] implies w /∈ W[2] \W[1], and
w ∈ W[2] \W[1] implies w /∈ W[1] \W[2]. Finally, we can define a bijection
f : W[1] \W[2] → W[2] \W[1] in the same way as in Case 1 and conclude that∣∣W[1] \W[2]∣∣ = ∣∣W[2] \W[1]∣∣ should follow and thus, ∣∣W[1]∣∣ = ∣∣W[2]∣∣ holds as
well. We conclude that ϕ1(G, s,p) = ϕ2(G, s,p) and thus, (G,N) satisfies
ET also in this case.
Case 3 (|Λ(G)| = |N |). Because each player participates in exactly one
match in this case, then for any configuration w of tree winners, a player is
a final winner of the competition only if he or she is the winner of the match
displayed by the unique tree he or she is seeded at by s. Thus,
∣∣W[i]∣∣ = ∣∣W[j]∣∣
holds for all i, j ∈ N . By ϕi(G, s,p) = (0.5)#G ·
∣∣W[i]∣∣ holding for each i ∈ N ,
(G,N) satisfies ET.
Suppose now that (G,N) is a league-type competition system satisfying
ET. To show that either |Λ(G)| = |N | or |Λ(G)| > |N | = 2 holds, let p be the
probability matrix with pij = 0.5 for all i, j ∈ N . Because each binary tree
of G is a balanced elementary tree, it suffices to show that, for some feasible
seeding rule, |Λ(G)| > |N | > 2 leads to a contradiction (as |N | ≤ |Λ(G)|
follows from (G,N) satisfying ET and the definition of a feasible seeding
rule). Consider then the following possible cases.
Case 1 (|N | is even and |Λ(G)| = |N |+2). Take the seeding rule s1 : Λ(G)→
N defined in such a way that there are exactly |Λ(G)|−|N |
2
+ 1 = 2 matches
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between player 1 and player 2 (with the corresponding elementary binary
trees being t′ and t′′), while the remaining |N |−2
2
matches are only played
between players from N \ {1, 2} with each of these players being assigned to
exactly one leaf of G. Notice that s1 ∈ S(G,N).
Consider the competition system (G\{t′} , N) and let s′1 : Λ(G\{t′})→ N
be such that s′1(λ) = s1(λ) for each λ ∈ Λ(G \ {t′}). Notice that s′1 ∈
S(G\{t′},N). Denote by W−t′[i] the set of configurations of tree winners in the
subcompetition (G \ {t′} , N) for i ∈ N and observe that, by |Λ(G \ {t′})| =
|N | and as argued in Case 3 above,
∣∣∣W−t′[1] ∣∣∣ = ∣∣∣W−t′[3] ∣∣∣. Take w∗ ∈ W−t′[1]
and note that this implies that player 1 wins the match t′′. Thus, for each
w∗ ∈ W−t′[1] there are exactly two configurations w′, w′′ ∈ W[1] of tree winners
for (G,N) where, everything else being the same, either player 1 wins at
t′ or player 2 wins at t′. On the other hand, for w∗∗ to belong to W−t
′
[3]
necessarily 3 wins his unique match. Thus, for each w∗∗ ∈ W−t′[3] there is a
unique configuration w′′′ ∈ W[3] of tree winners for (G,N) where, everything
else being the same, wt′ 6= wt′′ . We conclude then that
∣∣W[1]∣∣ > ∣∣W[3]∣∣ holds
and thus, by ϕ1(G, s1,p) = (0.5)
#G · ∣∣W[1]∣∣ > (0.5)#G · ∣∣W[3]∣∣ = ϕ3(G, s1,p),
we reach a contradiction to (G,N) satisfying ET.
Case 2 (|N | is even and |Λ(G)| > |N | + 2). Take the seeding rule s1 as
defined in Case 1, fix a configuration w, and note that, given the definition
of s1, player 3 is a final winner at w only if, for each i ∈ N , wt = i holds
for at most one tree t of G. However, by |Λ(G)|−|N |
2
+ 1 > 2, either player
1, player 2 or both necessarily win more than one match. We conclude
then that W[3] = ∅ should hold. Meanwhile, W[1] 6= ∅ because player 1 is a
final winner of the competition if he or she wins all its matches. We have
then ϕ1(G, s1,p) = (0.5)
#G · ∣∣W[1]∣∣ > 0 = (0.5)#G · |∅| = (0.5)#G · ∣∣W[3]∣∣ =
ϕ3(G, s1,p) in contradiction to (G,N) satisfying ET.
Case 3 (|N | is odd). Let N = {1, . . . , n} and take in this case the seeding
rule s2 : Λ(G) → N defined as follows. Exactly |Λ(G)|−|N |+12 matches are
played between player 1 and player 2, exactly one match between player 1
and player n, and the remaining |N |−3
2
matches are played between players
from N \ {1, n} with each of these players being assigned to exactly one leaf
of G. Notice that s2 ∈ S(G,N). We proceed by considering the following three
possible sub-cases.
Case 3.1 ( |Λ(G)|−|N |+1
2
= 1). Denote by t′ the unique tree at which players 1
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and 2 are seeded, and let t′′ be the unique tree at which players 1 and n are
seeded. These are the four possible combinations of winners in {t′, t′′}: (i)
1 wins in both t′ and t′′; (ii) 1 wins in t′ and n wins in t′′; (iii) 2 wins in t′
and 1 wins in t′′; and (iv) 2 wins in t′ and n wins in t′′. Notice that for every
configuration of winners in G\{t′, t′′} the maximal number of matches that a
player from N \{1, 2, n} wins is one. Therefore, for each of the configurations
of winners inG\{t′, t′′}, three out of the four possible combinations of winners
in {t′, t′′} give as a result a configuration w ∈ W[1] and only two give as a
result a configuration w ∈ W[n]. We conclude then that
∣∣W[1]∣∣ > ∣∣W[n]∣∣ holds
and thus, by ϕ1(G, s2,p) = (0.5)
#G · ∣∣W[1]∣∣ > (0.5)#G · ∣∣W[n]∣∣ = ϕn(G, s2,p),
we reach a contradiction to (G,N) satisfying ET.
Case 3.2 ( |Λ(G)|−|N |+1
2
= 2). Denote by t′ and t′′ the two trees at which
players 1 and 2 are seeded, and let t′′′ be the unique tree at which player
n is seeded. Analogously to Case 3.1, it is easy to compute that, for each
of the configurations of winners in G \ {t′, t′′, t′′′}, three out of the eight
possible combinations of winners in {t′, t′′, t′′′} give as a result a configuration
w ∈ W[1] and only two give as a result a configuration w ∈ W[n]. Therefore∣∣W[1]∣∣ > ∣∣W[n]∣∣ and thus, by ϕ1(G, s2,p) = (0.5)#G ·∣∣W[1]∣∣ > (0.5)#G ·∣∣W[n]∣∣ =
ϕn(G, s2,p), we reach again a contradiction to (G,N) satisfying ET.
Case 3.3 ( |Λ(G)|−|N |+1
2
> 2). Fix a configuration w and note that, given the
definition of s2, player n is a final winner at w only if, for any i ∈ N , wt = i
holds for at most one tree t of G. However, by |Λ(G)|−|N |+1
2
> 2, the latter
condition is violated for either player 1, player 2, or for both players. We
conclude then that W[n] = ∅ should hold. Meanwhile, W[1] 6= ∅ because player
1 is the winner of the competition if he or she wins all the matches that he or
she plays. We have then ϕ1(G, s2,p) = (0.5)
#G · ∣∣W[1]∣∣ > 0 = (0.5)#G · |∅| =
(0.5)#G · ∣∣W[n]∣∣ = ϕn(G, s2,p) in contradiction to (G,N) satisfying ET.
Proof of Theorem 5. Note first that if |Λ(G)| = |N | holds for some (G,N),
then the assertion follows from Theorem 4 and the fact that WET is weaker
than ET. Suppose now that (G,N) is such that |Λ(G)| = m · (|N | − 1) · |N |
for some integer m ≥ 1. Let s ∈ S(G,N) be the rule letting each player
participate in m matches against every other player from N . Moreover,
let p be the probability matrix with pij = 0.5 for all i, j ∈ N . We show
that (G,N) satisfies WET with respect to s. Recalling that ϕk(G, s,p) =
(0.5)#G · ∣∣W[k]∣∣ holds for each k ∈ N , then it is enough to prove that the
number of configurations of tree winners at which a particular player is a
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final winner is the same across all players. We proceed as follows.
For i, k ∈ N , let tik = (t1ik, t2ik, . . . , tmik) stand for the vector of trees of G
which display the m matches between player i and player k. Fix now two
players i and j, and for each w ∈ W[j] define the function f(w) as follows:
(1) For each x ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,m}: set f(wtxji) 6= wtxji ;
(2) For each k ∈ N \ {i, j} and each x ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,m}: if wtxjk = j and
wtxik = k, set f(wtxjk) = k and f(wtxik) = i;
(3) For each k ∈ N \ {i, j} and each x ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,m}: if wtxjk = k and
wtxik = i, set f(wtxjk) = j and f(wtxik) = k;
(4) For each k ∈ N \ {i, j} and each x ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,m}: if wtxjk = wtxik = k,
set f(wtxjk) = f(wtxik) = k;
(5) For each k ∈ N \ {i, j} and each x ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,m}: if wtxjk = j and
wtxik = i, set f(wtxjk) = j and f(wtxik) = i;
(6) For each q ∈ N \ {i, j}, each k ∈ N \ {q}, and each x ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,m}:
set f(wtxqk) = wtxqk .
Notice that, by construction, the number of matches won by i at f(w) is
the same as the number of matches won by j at w and vice versa. Moreover,
also by construction, for each k 6= i, j, the number of matches won by k is the
same in both w and f(w). Hence, w ∈ W[j] \W[i] implies f(w) ∈ W[i] \W[j],
while w ∈ W[j] ∩W[i] implies f(w) ∈ W[i] ∩W[j] and, thus, f(w) ∈ W[i] holds.
Let us now show that f is a bijection, that is, that w 6= w′ for w,w′ ∈ W[j]
implies f(w) 6= f(w′).
If wtxij 6= w′txij for some x ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,m} or wtxqk 6= w′txqk for some q ∈
N \ {i, j} and k ∈ N \ {q}, then f(wtxij) 6= f(w′txij) and f(wtxqk) 6= f(w′txqk)
clearly holds due to parts (1) and (6), respectively, of the above construction.
If j = wtxjk 6= w′txjk = k for some k ∈ N \ {i, j} and x ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,m}, then
the following four cases are possible:
(a) wtxik = w
′
txik
= i. We have then f(wtxjk) = j, f(wtxik) = i, f(w
′
txjk
) = j,
f(w′txik) = k;
(b) wtxik = w
′
txik
= k. We have then f(wtxjk) = k, f(wtxik) = i, f(w
′
txjk
) = k,
f(w′txik) = k;
(c) wtxik = i and w
′
txik
= k. We have then f(wtxjk) = j, f(wtxik) = i,
f(w′txjk) = k, f(w
′
txik
) = k;
(d) wtxik = k and w
′
txik
= i. We have then f(wtxjk) = k, f(wtxik) = i,
f(w′txjk) = j, f(w
′
txik
) = k.
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Thus, f(w) 6= f(w′) holds for each of the possible cases.
Finally, if i = wtxik 6= w′txik = k for some k ∈ N\{i, j} and x ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,m}
the situation is completely analogous to the previous one and, thus, one can
also in this last case conclude that f(w) 6= f(w′). We conclude that f is a
bijection and, therefore,
∣∣W[i]∣∣ = ∣∣W[j]∣∣ holds. Hence, (G,N) satisfies WET
with respect to s.
Proof of Theorem 6. We first show that if N = {1, 2}, then (G,N) satisfies
MS. Let p be an arbitrary but fixed probability matrix. Let s ∈ S(G,N) and
notice that, by the definition of a feasible seeding rule and N = {1, 2}, s
assigns each player from N to exactly |Λ(G)|
2
leaves of G. Suppose now that
p12 > 0.5. We have to show that ϕ1(G, s,p) − ϕ2(G, s,p) ≥ 0 holds. If
#G = 1 then the inequality follows immediately. Suppose then that #G ≥ 2
and consider the following two cases.
Case 1 (|Λ(G)| > |N | = 2 and #G is odd). Note that in this case we have
ϕ1(G, s,p) = p
#G
12 + p
#G−1
12 · p21 + p#G−212 · p221 + . . .+ p(#G+1)/212 · p(#G+1)/2−121
and
ϕ2(G, s,p) = p
#G
21 + p
#G−1
21 · p12 + p#G−221 · p212 + . . .+ p(#G+1)/221 · p(#G+1)/2−112 .
Thus, ϕ1(G, s,p)−ϕ2(G, s,p) =
(
p#G12 − p#G21
)
+p12·p21·
(
p#G−212 − p#G−221
)
+
. . . + p
(#G+1)/2−1
12 · p(#G+1)/2−121 · (p12 − p21) > 0, where the inequality follows
from p12 > 0.5. We conclude that (G,N) satisfies MS.
Case 2 (|Λ(G)| > |N | = 2 and #G is even). When expressing ϕ1(G, s,p)
and ϕ2(G, s,p) for this case there are two differences in comparison to the
corresponding expressions in Case 1. First, (#G+1)/2 should be replaced by
#G/2+1, and (#G+1)/2−1 by #G/2−1. Second, in both expressions the
probabilities of the configurations where both players, 1 and 2, are winners
should be considered; that is, the term p
#G/2
12 +p
#G/2
21 should be added in both
expressions. Since these configurations for player 1 and player 2 do coincide
(due to #G being even), the added terms are the same for both players.
Thus, they cancel out when taking the difference between ϕ1(G, s,p) and
ϕ2(G, s,p). Thus, by reproducing the same reasoning as in Case 1, we can
conclude that (G,N) satisfies MS also in this case.
Suppose now that (G,N) satisfies MS. We show that |N | > 2 leads to a
contradiction. Consider first the case where N = {1, 2, 3} and the following
probability matrix:
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p =
 0.5 0.5 + ε 1− ε0.5 1− 2ε
0.5

Take the seeding rule s ∈ S(G,N) that assigns players to leaves in such a
way that there is exactly one match between player 1 and player 2, and there
are |Λ(G)|−2
2
matches between player 2 and player 3.
If #G = 2, then ϕ1(G, s,p) ≈ 0.5 and ϕ2(G, s,p) ≈ 1 in contradiction to
p12 > 0.5 and (G,N) satisfying MS.
If #G > 2, given s and v, we have that player 2 wins with probability
arbitrarily close to 1 all matches except one and, therefore, he or she wins
with probability close to one most of the matches. Thus, ϕ2(G, s,p) ≈ 1
and ϕ1(G, s,p) ≈ 0, reaching again a contradiction to p12 > 0.5 and (G,N)
satisfying MS.
Suppose next that |N | > 3 holds and consider a probability matrix p
such that p23 > 0.5 and p3k ≈ 1 for all k ∈ N \ {1, 2}. We distinguish the
following two cases.
Case 1 (|Λ(G)| = |N |). In this case each feasible seeding rule assigns each
player to exactly one leaf of G. Take s1 ∈ S(G,N) to be such that there are
initial matches between players 1 and 2, and 3 and 4, respectively. Note that,
for any configuration of tree winners, a player is a final winner in the entire
competition only if he or she wins his or her unique match according to s1.
Thus, ϕ3(G, s1,p) ≈ 1 and ϕ2(G, s1,p) ≤ 0.5 in contradiction to p23 > 0.5
and (G,N) satisfying MS.
Case 2 (|Λ(G)| > |N |). Consider the seeding rule s2 ∈ S(G,N) defined as
follows: players are assigned to leaves in such a way that players 1 and 2
are seeded exactly once and they play against each other, while player 3
participates in each of the other |Λ(G)|−2
2
matches. Note that, according to s2
and the probability matrix p, player 3 wins with probability arbitrarily close
to one all matches he is participating in and, therefore, he or she wins with
probability close to one every match of the competition except one (the one
played between players 1 and 2). Hence, ϕ3(G, s2,p) ≈ 1 and ϕ2(G, s2,p) ≈ 0
in contradiction to p23 > 0.5 and (G,N) satisfying MS.
Proof of Theorem 7. Let us start with the case where |Λ(G)| = |N |. Let
p be an arbitrary but fixed probability matrix and, recalling that |N | is even,
consider the seeding rule s1 : Λ(G)→ N defined by s1(λ(t))+s1(λ′(t)) = n+1
holding for each t ∈ G. That is, s1 matches in the elementary binary trees of
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G the best player with the worst one, the second best with the second worst,
and so on. Clearly, given s1, a player is a final winner in a configuration of
tree winners if and only if he is the winner of the unique match that he or
she plays. Thus, for k ∈ N , we have ϕk(G, s1,p) = pkk′ with k′ ∈ N being
the player seeded by s1 at the same tree as player k.
Suppose now that pij > 0.5 holds for some i, j ∈ N . We have to show
that ϕi(G, s1,p) ≥ ϕj(G, s1,p) follows in such a case. For this, let t∗ ∈ G be
the unique binary tree at which i is seeded by s1 together with some other
player i′, and t∗∗ ∈ G be the unique binary tree at which j is seeded by
s1 together with some other player j
′. If i′ = j, then i and j are seeded
by s1 to the same tree and thus, ϕi(G, s1,p) = pij > pji = ϕj(G, s1,p)
follows. If i′ 6= j, we have from pij > 0.5 that iRj holds, while j′Ri′ holds
due to the construction of s1. Thus, pii′ ≥ pjj′ follows by (3). We have then
ϕi(G, s1,p) = pii′ ≥ pjj′ = ϕj(G, s1,p) as required for showing that (G,N)
satisfies WMS with respect to s1.
Let us now consider a league-type competition (G,N) such that |Λ(G)| ≥
2 (|N | − 1) holds. Fix a probability matrix p and consider the seeding rule
s2 defined as follows: player 1 is seeded to each tree of G, each player
k ∈ {3, . . . , n} is seeded to exactly one tree of G, and player 2 is seeded
to each of the remaining trees of G. Because there are at least (|N | − 1)
matches in the competition, s2 ∈ S(G,N) follows. We show that (G,N) satis-
fies WMS with respect to s2 in three steps. In what follows T
(12) stands for
the set of matches played between 1 and 2 according to s2.
Step 1 If p12 > 0.5, then ϕ1(G, s2, p) ≥ ϕ2(G, s2, p).
Proof. Recall that ϕ1(G, s2,p) =
∑
w∈W[1]
pr(w) and ϕ2(G, s2,p) =
∑
w∈W[2]
pr(w).
Given a configuration w of winners let T
(12)
wt=1 be the set of trees t in T
(12) such
that wt = 1, and let T
(12)
wt=2 be the set of trees t in T
(12) such that wt = 2.
Define the mapping f : W[2] → W[1] by just exchanging, for each t ∈ T (12),
the winner of the tree. That is, for all t ∈ T (12), wt = 1 if and only if f(w)t = 2
and wt = 2 if and only if f(w)t = 1. Notice that for w,w
′ ∈ W[2] with w 6= w′,
f(w) 6= f(w′) follows and thus, f is a bijection between W[2] and a subset of
W[1].
Note also that, for any configuration w of tree winners we have: pr(w) =∏
t∈G\T (12)
ϕwt(t, s2,p)
∏
t∈T (12)wt=1
p12
∏
t∈T (12)wt=2
p21.
Finally, note that, by w ∈ W[2], player 2 wins at w at least as many
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matches against player 1 as player 1 against player 2; that is,
∣∣∣T (12)wt=2∣∣∣ ≥∣∣∣T (12)wt=1∣∣∣. Thus, ∣∣∣T (12)f(w)t=1∣∣∣ ≥ ∣∣∣T (12)f(w)t=2∣∣∣. We have then from p12 > p21 that∏
t∈T (12)wt=1
p12
∏
t∈T (12)wt=2
p21 ≤
∏
t∈T (12)
f(w)t=1
p12
∏
t∈T (12)
(w)t=2
p21 holds. Therefore, pr(w) ≤
pr(f(w)) holds for each w ∈ W[2], which allows us to conclude that ϕ1(G, s2,p) ≥
ϕ2(G, s2,p).
Step 2 If pij > 0.5 for i ∈ {1, 2} and j ∈ N \ {1, 2}, then ϕi(G, s2,p) ≥
ϕj(G, s2,p).
Proof. Note first that if
∣∣T (12)∣∣ > 2 then W[j] = ∅ and ϕi(G, s2,p) ≥ 0 =
ϕj(G, s2,p) immediately follows.
If
∣∣T (12)∣∣ = 2, then w ∈ W[j] implies that every player wins exactly one
match (including players 1 and 2) and all players are winners of the entire
competition. Thus, w ∈ W[j] implies w ∈ W[i]; that is, W[j] ⊆ W[i] holds and
hence, ϕi(G, s2,p) ≥ ϕj(G, s2,p) follows.
Suppose now that
∣∣T (12)∣∣ = 1. Recall that only configurations in W[i]\W[j]
and in W[j]\W[i] do matter for the comparison of ϕi(G, s2,p) and ϕj(G, s2,p).
If i = 1, then W[j] \W[1] = {w} with w consisting of player 1 losing all his
matches and thus pr(w) = p21 · p31 · . . . · pn1. Meanwhile, the configuration
w′ of tree winners where player 1 wins all the matches he or she plays does
definitely belong to W[1] \W[j], with pr(w′) = p12 · p13 · . . . · p1n. Then, given
that p1k ≥ pk1 for each k ∈ N \{1} (with strict inequality holding for k = j),
we have that ϕ1(G, s2,p) > ϕj(G, s2,p).
In contrast, i = 2 implies W[j] \W[2] = {w} with w consisting of 1 only
winning his match against 2 and pr(w) = p12 ·p31 ·p41 · . . . ·pn1. Consider now
the configuration w′ of tree winners which differs from w only with respect to
the fact that at w′ player 2 wins his unique match against player 1 and player
j loses his unique match against player 1. This involves that w′ ∈ W[2] \W[j]
with pr(w′) ≥ pr(w) due to p21 ≥ pj1 following from p2j > 0.5 and condition
(2). We conclude then that ϕ2(G, s2,p) ≥ ϕj(G, s2,p).
Step 3 If pij > 0.5 for some i, j ∈ N \{1, 2}, then ϕi(G, s2,p) ≥ ϕj(G, s2,p).
Proof. Recall that in this situation each of the players i and j participates in
exactly one match against player 1. Let us then consider the following three
possible cases.
Case 1 (
∣∣T (12)∣∣ = 1). In this case, there is a unique configuration w ∈
W[j] \ W[i] consisting of player j winning his match against player 1 and
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player 1 winning only his match against player i. The probability of w is
then pr(w) = pj1 · p1i ·
∏
k 6=i,j
pk1. Similarly, there is a unique configuration
w′ ∈ W[i] \W[j] with pr(w′) = pi1 · p1j ·
∏
k 6=i,j
pk1. By pij > 0.5 and condition
(2), p1j · pi1 ≥ pj1 · p1i follows. We have then pr(w′) ≥ pr(w) which implies
ϕi(G, s2,p) ≥ ϕj(G, s2,p).
Case 2 (
∣∣T (12)∣∣ = 2). In this case, each of the two configurations of tree
winners in W[j] has the following structure: each of the players in N \ {1, 2}
(including i and j) wins his or her match against player 1; player 1 uniquely
wins one of his or her matches against player 2, and player 2 wins the other
match that players 1 and 2 are playing together. Clearly, W[j] = W[i] and
thus, ϕi(G, s2,p) = ϕj(G, s2,p) holds.
Case 3 (
∣∣T (12)∣∣ > 2). In this case, given that there are more than two matches
between player 1 and 2, W[i] = W[j] = ∅. Thus ϕi(G, s2,p) = ϕj(G, s2,p) =
0.
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